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SOUND AND FURY SIGNIFYING NOTHING?:
JÜRGEN BÜSSOW’S BATTLE AGAINST
HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
ERIC T. EBERWINE*
Propaganda has only one object . . . to conquer the masses. Every means that furthers
this aim is good; every means that hinders it is bad.1
The combination of hatred and technology is the greatest danger threatening mankind.2
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine.3

I.

INTRODUCTION

Derek Black is a thirteen-year-old webmaster. He is responsible
for designing his own web page, replete with eye-catching animated
graphics, articles about Martin Luther King, Jr., and a collection of
optical illusions. Perhaps these are not unusual features for a teenager’s web site. However, Derek’s page takes on a darker meaning
because it is the “Kid’s Page” featured on Stormfront.org, (“Stormfront”) a site run by his father, Don Black, promoting “White Pride
World Wide.” Don Black, who succeeded David Duke as the leader
of the Ku Klux Klan in 1980, founded Stormfront on January 11,
1995.4 Since then, Stormfront has grown to become one of the Internet’s most popular right-extremist web sites, boasting a traffic
* J.D., New York Law School (2003).
1. JOESEPH GOEBBELS, THE GOEBBELS DIARIES: 1942-1943 13 (Louis P. Lochner ed.
& trans., 1948).
2. SIMON WIESENTHAL, JUSTICE, NOT VENGEANCE 358 (Ewald Osers trans., Grove
Weidenfeld 1989).
3. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,
concurring).
4. See http://www.stormfront.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
353
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rank of 4,222 with 1,405 other linking sites.5 By way of comparison, the Anti-Defamation League’s web page, has a traffic rank of
22,109.6
Gary “Gerhard” Lauck publishes Nazi newspapers in twelve languages and offers a free download of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf on
his web site Nazi-Lauck-nsdapao.com (“Lauck” or “Nazi-Lauck”).7
Lauck provides a wide selection of Nazi propaganda materials and
also sells Nazi memorabilia. Although Lauck’s site does not enjoy
the popularity of Stormfront, Gary Lauck does have the distinction
of having been imprisoned for four years in Germany for inciting
racial hatred and disseminating illegal propaganda.8
Savvy right-extremists have adapted to advances in information
technology. Specifically, they have utilized the Internet to proselytize their hatred. Stormfront’s astonishing popularity is an example
of this phenomenon. Many of these web sites are located within the
United States, where the courts have emphatically provided the
highest level of protection to controversial Internet sites under the
First Amendment.9
The Internet is a truly global medium that is “ambient - nowhere in particular and everywhere at once.”10 Web sites such as
Stormfront, based in Palm Beach, Florida, and Nazi-Lauck, based in
Lincoln, Nebraska are simultaneously available around the world.
5. See http://www.alexa.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2003). Alexa.com provides
free traffic rankings and data for Internet sites. See also Tara McKelvey, Father and Son
Team on Hate Site, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-07-16-kid-hate-sites.htm (last
visited July 16, 2001).
6. See Anti-Defamation League at http://www.adl.org (last visited Sept. 15,
2004); see also http://www.alexa.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). Other Alexa.com traffic rankings for comparison: ACLU.org 15,047; Wiesenthal.com 30,326; Tolerance.org
56,417.
7. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
8. Nancy Finkin, Nebraska’s Nazi, at http://www.net.unl.edu/~swi/pers/nazi.
html (Mar. 24, 1995). Gary Lauck was convicted in Hamburg, Germany on August 22,
1996. Lauck was arrested in Denmark and was extradited to Germany (Mar. 24, 1995).
See also http://www.alexa.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2003). The traffic rank on the NaziLauck site on October 27, 2003 was 338,868. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 238 F.3d 420
(6th Cir. 2000); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Reno II”), cert. granted, 532
U.S. 1037 (2001); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Shea v. Reno, 930
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997).
10. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 169 (quoting Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz. 1998)).
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Not all countries, however, afford the same constitutional protection for hate-speech as the United States Supreme Court.11 This
raises the following questions: Should web sites based in the United
States and protected under the First Amendment be subject to regulation in foreign countries? Or should countries with stricter
speech regimes be able to block web site content or even force the
content to be taken down and removed from servers in other countries? In other words, should the First Amendment be the default
standard for free speech on the Internet? Further, should the Internet be thought of as an “American environment”?12
Germany’s response to these questions appears to be an emphatic Nein! Düsseldorf District Government President Jürgen Büssow has ordered all Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) in the
German State of Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) to
block user access13 to the U.S.-based Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck
sites. Büssow’s Sperrungsverfügung 14 (hereinafter “Blocking-Order”)
has taken a highly controversial, and hotly debated stance on the

11. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the First
Amendment does not permit the government to impose special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. The petitioner was charged with a violation of the St. Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code
§ 292.02 (1990), for allegedly burning a cross in the yard of an African-American
family).
12. For example, one may argue that the interest is an “American Environment”
due to the concentration of power in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”), incorporated and located in the United States. See generally John
Perry Barlow, The Accra Manifesto (Mar. 12, 2002), available at http://www.eon.law.
harvard.edu/ghana2002/icann.html (discussing the significant concentration of power
in ICANN). ICANN is responsible for IP address space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system management, and root server system management
functions). Id. See also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
(February 8, 1996), available at http://www.eff.org/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/
barlow_0296.declaration (“Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based on matter. There is no matter
here.”).
13. The term “user access” refers to Internet users in the general public. Büssow’s
Sperrungsverfügung does not apply when the prohibited sites are accessed for science,
research, or educational purposes. See Sperrungsverfügung, v. 06.02.2002.
14. The Sperrungsverfügung is an Administrative Order issued by the Düsseldorf
District Government. The Sperrungsverfügung is currently in force for all of North
Rhine-Westphalia pending further judicial review.
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question of racist and xenophobic content on the Internet.15 To
date, Büssow’s Blocking-Order has found near unanimous support
in German courts.
Jürgen Büssow’s Blocking-Order is consistent with United Nations and European Union attitudes towards regulating racist and
xenophobic speech. The Blocking-Order in many ways is a local
reaction to the First Amendment protections afforded hate-speech
in the United States, as well as a reflection of unique social and
moral values forged in Europe following World War II. The fundamental split in attitude towards hate-speech between the U.S., U.N.,
and E.U. forms a contextual backdrop for the more focused legal
debate developing in Germany.
In Germany, the debate turns on just how the Internet, or
more precisely Internet access, should be legally defined and there15. See Arved Greiner, Sperrungsverfügungen als Mittel der Gefahrenabwehr im Internet,
8 COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 620 (2002); Bernd Holznagel and Stephanie Kussel, Möglichkeiten und Risiken bei der Bekämpfung rechtsradikaler Inhalte im Internet, 6 MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 347 (2001); Bernd Holznagel, Meinungsfreiheit oder Free Speech im
Internet, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIEN- UND KOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT 93 (2002); Michael
Hornig, Möglichkeiten des Ordnungsrechts bei der Bekämpfung rechtsextremistischer Inhalte im
Internet- Zur Internet-Aufsicht auf der grundlage des § 18 Mediendienste-Staatsvertrags, 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 846 (2001); Christian Koenig and Sascha Loetz, Sperrungsanordnungen gegenüber Network- und Access-Providern, 7 CR 438
(1999); Kristian Köhntopp and Marit Köhntopp, Sperrungen im Internet, 1 KOMMUNIKATION UND RECHT [K&R] 25 (1998); Peter Mankowski, Die Düsseldorfer Sperrungsverfügungalles andere als rheinischer Karneval, 5 MMR Editorial (2002); Andreus Neumann,
Ordnungsrechtliche Sperrungsverfuugungen und die Informationsfreiheit nach Art. 5 Abs. 1 S. 1
2. Alt. GG, (2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/artikel/sperrunginffreiheit.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2002); Gerhard Schneider, Die Wirksamkeit der Sperrung von InternetZugriffen, 10 MMR 571 (1999); Jürgen Schütte, Sperrung von Internet-Seiten mit verbotenem
Inhalt- Und es geht doch 23 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] (2002); Gerald
Spindler and Christian Volkmann, Die öffentlich-rechtliche Störerhaftung der Access-Provider,
8 K&R 398 (2002); Thomas Stadler, Sperrungsverfügung gegen Access-Provider, 6 MMR 343
(2002); Thomas Stadler, Verantwortlichkeit für Hyperlinks nach der Neufassung des TDG,
INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSINFORMATIK, JurPC Web-Dok. 2/2003 (Jan. 13, 2003),
at http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20030002.htm.; Andreus Zimmermann, Polizeiliche
Gefahrenabwehr und das Internet, 43 NJW 3145 (1999). See also Materialien zu: InternetSperrungsverfügungen, Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Verteidigung der Informationsfreiheit in Datennetzen [DAVID], at http://www.david-gegen-goliath.org (last visited
April 20, 2003); Internationaler Kongress “Hass und Gewalt im Internet,” Bezirksregierung
Düsseldorf, Landesanstalt für Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://
www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/themen/Sicherheit_und_Ordnung/
Medienmissbrauch/Internationaler_Kongress__Hass_und_Gewalt_im_Internet_.php
(last visited April 20, 2003).
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fore regulated. The Federal Communications Commission and
courts in the United States have recently struggled with this question as well.16 Is Internet access a telecommunications service, a
broadcast service, or something else entirely? In Germany, the debate is fueled by a separation of regulatory competence between
the Bund (federal government) and the Länder (German states).17
The Bund is responsible for regulating the means by which electronic media is distributed, including telecommunications. The
Länder regulate content, including broadcasting, via a series of inter-state treaties.
This Note examines the conflict between the German Bund
and the Länder concerning regulation of Internet service and, more
specifically, Internet content. The development of German media
law supports the conclusion that State law — not federal law — will
control the issue of content regulation on the Internet. Büssow’s
Blocking-Order is premised on State law, and to date, the administrative courts in Nordrhein-Westfalen have agreed that State law is
the proper foundation. While ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen will undoubtedly appeal the administrative court decisions, finding that
Internet content may be subject to federal regulation would ultimately require the German courts to reevaluate constitutional court
precedent and the German Constitution itself.
To that end, Part II of this Note explores the historical roles of
the Bund and Länder in regulating media through German constitutional law and relevant case law. Next, Part III demonstrates that
there is a fundamental conflict in legally defining Internet service
16. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27
(D.D.C. 2003) (discussing that an ISP falls within one of four categories based on how
content has interacted with the service provider’s system or network); MediaOne v.
County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“MediaOne’s Road Runner
service contains news, commentary, games, and other proprietary content with which
subscribers interact as well as Internet access, and therefore it falls under the statutory
definition of ‘cable service.’”); AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (ISP
provides both an information and telecommunication service); FCC Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, FCC
00-355 (rel. Sept. 28, 2000); In Re Fed.-State Joint Bd. On Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd.
11501 (1998) (“Internet service providers themselves provide information services
. . . .”).
17. Timo Rosenkranz, Sperrungsanordnungen gegen Access-Provider, JurPC Web-Dok.
16/2003, (Feb. 3, 2003) ¶4 INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSINFORMATIK, at http://
www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20030016.htm.
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and Internet content under existing German law, namely the
Länder’s Staatsvertrag über Mediendienste (Mediendienste-Staatsvertag)18
(“State Treaty on Media Services” or “MDStV”), and the Bund’s
Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen für Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz)19
(“IuKDG”). The conflict in legislative competence between the
Bund and Länder is discussed within the greater context of conflict
in regulatory attitudes with the United States. Part IV analyzes the
legality and applicability of either Bund or Länder statutory law to
Büssow’s Blocking-Order through a statutory comparison, legal criticism of the Blocking-Order, and ultimately recent German court
decisions interpreting Büssow’s Blocking-Order. Finally, Part V argues that Jürgen Büssow’s Blocking-Order is likely to survive subsequent judicial scrutiny in Germany, with the result that German
ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen will be forced to block user access to
racist and xenophobic web sites originating in the United States.
This conclusion is supported by the unique development of German media law, constitutional law, and the criminal code, as well as
U.N. and E.U. law.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT

OF

GERMAN MEDIA LAW

Legislation often reflects the state of media technology at the
time it was drafted, and therefore often fails to anticipate new technological developments.20 It is no surprise that there are unique
challenges in regulating the Internet, which at times incorporates
or closely mimics older forms of media, such as broadcasting or
telecommunications, but is simultaneously a completely new form
of mass media. It is therefore important to recognize the unique
German approach to regulating traditional media, not only in
terms of legislative competence, but also with regard to how the
18. Staatsvertrag über Mediendienste [State Treaty on Media Services] [MDStV],
v. 20.01.1997 (BerlGVB1. S. 360), amended by v. 12.12.2001 (BerlGVB1 S. 162).
19. Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen für Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste- Gesetz) [Statute on
the General Conditions of Information and Communication Services] [IuKDG], v.
13.06.1997 (BGB1. I S. 1870-1879).
20. Katja Stamm, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Meinungsfreiheit, [The Constitutional Court and the Freedom of Opinion], Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B37-38/2001
at 24 (2001).
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German Constitution has been applied to mass media. The following discussion will highlight the most important legal developments
in German media law, and will provide a framework for analyzing
the legality and potential success of Jürgen Büssow’s BlockingOrder.
A. The Basic Law and Basic Rights
After World War II, the process of democratization began in
Germany. In September 1948, members of the German parliamentary council began to draft a new constitution, and on May 23, 1949
Germany’s Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, went into effect.21 Not surprisingly, the new Basic Law included strong reactions against Nazi
ideology, including strong affirmations of equality, personal honor,
and freedom of expression.22
The Grundrechte, or Basic Rights, form the cornerstone of the
Basic Law. The central purpose of the Basic Rights section is to
protect the individual’s “sphere of freedom” from encroachment by
the state.23 The Basic Rights create an objective system of values
focused on the freedom of a human being to develop in society,
and these rights “apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the
whole legal system: must direct and inform legislation, administration, and judicial decision.”24 Further, private law may not conflict
with the Basic Rights, and judges must consider the “radiant effect”
of the Basic Rights on private law and implement the values inherent in constitutional law.25
Article 5 of the Basic Law addresses freedom of expression and
freedom of the press.26 With Nazi control as a backdrop, it became
clear that broadcasting freedom demanded freedom from centralized state control.27 In particular, the principle of broadcasting
freedom was deemed to be incompatible with pre-publication cen21. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] v. 23.5.1949 (BGB1. I, 2470 (F.R.G.).
22. Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 1-5 (F.R.G).
23. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Lüth].
24. Id.
25. Id. See Stamm, supra note 20; see also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994)
(F.R.G.) [hereinafter Auschwitzlüge], infra, note 81.
26. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5.
27. ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 34 (1993).
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sorship by government.28 Indeed, Article 5 of the Basic Law specifically proscribes censorship29 as well as attempts to restrict access to
information.30
The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
held that broadcasting freedom (Rundfunkfreiheit) is an instrumental freedom (dienende Freiheit) serving the more fundamental freedom of speech.31 Broadcasting freedom should be protected as
long as it promotes the goals of free speech, namely an informed
democracy and the discussion of a wide variety of views.32 Broadcasting freedom, therefore, is not an unlimited freedom, but instead is balanced against a social conception of free speech in
society.33 Thus, it is permissible to restrict broadcasting freedom in
order to protect the greater goal of a free democratic society.
B. Separation of Power: Foundations in Broadcasting Law
Freedom from state control and censorship is a prominent feature in the structure of German broadcasting. In First Television 34
the German Constitutional Court underscored the importance of
freedom from state control when it held that the federal government’s foundation of Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH ran afoul of the
Basic Law’s distribution of powers between the federal and state
28. Id.
29. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1) (“Eine Zensur findet nicht statt”) [There shall be
no censorship].
30. Id. (“und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten”) [and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources].
31. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 34. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1) (“Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be
guaranteed.”). See also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 57, 295 (320) (1981) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter
Third Broadcasting]; Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 73, 118 (152) (1986) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Fourth
Broadcasting].
32. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 34; See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1).
33. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(2) (“These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons,
and in the right to personal honor.”).
34. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 12, 205 (1961) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter First Television].
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government and the fundamental principle of broadcasting freedom guaranteed under Article 5.35
First Television emphasized the separate roles of the federal and
state governments in broadcasting. The Constitutional Court determined that under Article 73(7) of the Basic Law, the federal government has the authority to regulate the establishment and
operation of broadcasting transmission facilities.36 The Court
found that broadcasting transmitters are part of the telecommunications system within the meaning of Article 73(7), but that the
telecommunications system only comprises the technical steps in
the transmission of broadcasting presentations.37 Within the meaning of Article 73(7), the telecommunications system comprises the
technical requirements whose regulation is necessary for the efficient operation of broadcasters and the reception of their programs.38 Specifically, the federal government is granted authority
under Article 73(7) to assign frequencies and regulate other technical aspects of transmission technology.39
Because the federal government’s authority to regulate broadcasting is limited to technical aspects of transmission under the definition of telecommunications in Article 73, it follows that the same
distinction in federal regulatory authority must apply to other Articles within the Basic Law. Article 5 of the Basic Law uses the term
“Broadcasting,” which according to the Constitutional Court,
means broadcasting as an institution.40 Article 5 does not permit
the assumption that the term “telecommunications system” covers
broadcasting as a whole, but may only apply to those areas that
serve the conveyance of presentations, assignment of licenses and
frequencies or transmission technology.41
35. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35. Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH was to be a national television station owned by the Federal government.
36. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 73 (Gegenstände
der ausschließlichen Gesetzgebung) [Subjects of exclusive legislative power] (“Der
Bund hat die ausschließliche Gesetzgebung über . . . das Postwesen und Telekommunikation”) [“The Federation shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect to
. . . postal and telecommunication services”].
37. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(1).
41. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
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Further, the court found that as a medium of mass communication, broadcasting belongs “in the neighborhood of press and
film.”42 Indeed, Article 5 refers to press, film, and broadcasting in
the same sentence.43 While Article 75(2) expressly provides for the
federal government’s legislative competence in the general legal affairs of press and film, broadcasting is not mentioned.44 As such,
the federal government may enact framework provisions dealing
with the general legal affairs of the press and film, but it is not entitled to exclusive legislative competence for broadcasting as a
whole.45
Regarding the general structure of legislative competence of
the federal and state governments, the Basic Law operates under
the principal that the states have primary competence.46 The federal government only has legislative competence to the extent that
the Basic Law endows it.47 In cases of doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the federal government, there is no assumption under the
Basic Law that argues in favor of federal competence.48 The general principal “Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht” or “Federal Law breaks
State Law” in Article 31 of the Basic Law is applicable only if the
federal government has specific legislative competence over the
states.49 Relevant here, the federal government has no constitutional competence to regulate mass-communications, and as such
federal law may not pre-empt state law governing mass-communica42. Id.
43. Grundgesetz [GG] art.5(1) (“Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet.)” [Freedom of the
press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be
guaranteed.]).
44. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 75 (Rahmenvorschriften) [Areas of federal framework legislation].
45. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II). See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 75
(Rahmenvorschriften) [Areas of federal framework legislation].
46. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 10, 89 (101) (1959) (F.R.G.).
47. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 70(1).
48. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 (“[T]he Basic Law calls for a strict interpretation of arts. 73ff. Basic Law”).
49. Cornelius von Heyl, Jugendschutz im Internet- Mit Software gegen harte SachenFachtagung des Ministeriums für Kultur, Jugend, Familie und Frauen Rheinland-Pfalz, at
http://www.jugendschutz.net/Schaubilder_29-05-982.htm. (May 29, 1998).

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR104.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 11

BATTLE AGAINST HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET

15-DEC-04

8:40

363

tions.50 This distinction will weigh heavily in analyzing the applicability of state law in regulating Internet content.
The Constitutional Court found that broadcasting is also a cultural phenomenon.51 To the extent that cultural matters can be
administered and regulated by the state,52 they nevertheless fall, in
accordance with the Basic Law’s fundamental decision,53 in the
area of the states54 when special provisions of the Basic Law do not
provide restrictions or exceptions in favor of the federal government. This fundamental decision by the Basic Law, which is in effect a decision in favor of a federalist structure promoting
separation of powers within the State, forbids, especially in the area
of cultural matters, the assumption that the federal government has
jurisdiction without a sufficiently clear, contrary rule of
exception.55
The Constitutional Court determined that broadcasting is a
“public function” and not a function of the centralized federal government in accordance with the development of German law.56 In
founding Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH, the federal government
violated Article 30 in conjunction with Article 83 of the Basic Law.57
The Court stated that broadcasting in Germany is a public service
under public responsibility.58 The broadcasting of programs as a
function of public administration is covered by the delineation of
competencies between the federal government and the states.59 As
a form of public service, the states, a more local form of government, have exclusive jurisdiction over broadcasting content.
In subsequent cases, the Constitutional Court emphasized that
freedom from state control requires the legislature to frame some
50. Id. See also Rosenkranz, supra note 17, at 4.
51. See von Heyl, supra note 49.
52. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts BVerfGE 10, 20 (36f).
53. Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 30, 70, 83.
54. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts BVerfGE 6, 309 (354).
55. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
56. Id.
57. Id. Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise
of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the Länder. See
Grundgesetz [GG] art. 30; see also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 83 (noting that the Länder
shall execute federal laws in their own right insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise
provide or permit).
58. See Grundgesetz [GG] arts. 30, 83.
59. Id.
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basic rules ensuring that the state government is unable to exercise
any influence over the selection, content, or scheduling of programs.60 The Fourth61 and Sixth Television62 cases struck down state
law provisions which allowed the state government or licensing authority unlimited discretion in allocating permits and frequencies,63
thereby acknowledging the danger that the executive could choose
between applicants on the basis of their programming.64
C. Pluralism
In addition to the restriction of state influence, the German
Constitutional Court took measures to ensure pluralism in broadcasting. The Third Television case re-emphasized that freedom of
broadcasting “is a freedom serving the freedom of formation of
opinion in the latter’s subjective and objective legal elements:
Under the conditions of modern mass communication, it forms a
necessary addition and reinforcement of this freedom; it serves the
mandate of ensuring free, comprehensive formation of opinion by
way of broadcasting.”65 It is the responsibility of the legislature to
ensure that a positive regulatory order exists to ensure that public
opinion is expressed in broadcasting as widely and completely as
possible.66 To achieve this goal, substantive, organizational, and
procedural rules are necessary to give effect to the guarantee of
broadcasting freedom mandated by Article 5(1) of the Basic Law.67
However, the mandate flowing from Article 5 of the Basic Law
that freedom of broadcasting be given a legal structure does not
give any authority to restrict that basic right.68 The rights guaranteed in the first paragraph of Article 5 are only limited by Article
5(2), which provides that broadcasting freedom may be limited in
accordance with provisions of general laws, the provisions of law for
the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal
60. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35.
61. Fourth Broadcasting, BVerfGE 73, 118 (1986).
62. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 83, 238 (1991) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Sixth Broadcasting].
63. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 35.
64. Sixth Television, BVerfGE 83, 118 (1991).
65. Third Television, BVerfGE 57, 295 (1981).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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honor.69 This provision is the basis for all speech restrictions in
Germany.
The court continued, stating that the Basic Law did not contemplate a particular form of organization of broadcasting.70 The
sole issue should be that free, comprehensive, and truthful formation of opinion is guaranteed, and that the legislature provide safeguards to ensure that broadcasting is not left to the mercy of one or
several societal groups, that all relevant societal forces have their
say, and that the freedom of reporting remains unimpaired.71
To further ensure that the pluralistic values of public broadcasting are protected, controlling broadcasting authorities are
charged with determining balanced programming schedules.72
The broadcasting authorities, or Rundfunkräte, are composed of
members representing a wide variety of interest groups in order to
prevent the domination of the media by a particular political party
or commercial interest.73 First Television emphasized the need for
adequate rules to ensure that all significant social forces can exercise influence on the administration of public broadcasting authorities.74 While the court did not exclude some state representation
on the broadcasting authorities, Article 5 of the Basic Law did preclude state control, whether direct or indirect.75 Indeed, Länder
statutes governing the composition of broadcasting authorities have
generally provided for balanced representation of all significant political, cultural, and industrial groups to ensure a broad range of
impartial programs.76
It is clear that the principal developments in German broadcasting law will be broadly applied to Internet regulation. Whether
69. Id. See generally Grundgesetz [GG] Part I, (Die Grundrechte) [Basic Rights];
see also Stamm, supra note 20, at 20.
70. See Stamm, supra note 20, at 20.
71. Id.
72. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 60.
73. Id.
74. First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205, 261-62.
75. See BARENDT, supra note 27, at 60.
76. Id. The Rundfunkrat must be composed of 42 members, of which 17 members must be from such social groups and institutions as the Evangelical Church in
Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Catholic Church, the State Association of the Jewish Religious
Community, and the German Trade Union of Nordrhein-Westfalen. See, e.g., Gesetz
über den “Westdeutschen Rundfunk Köln” (WDRG) [“Code on the German Broadcasting Co., Cologne”], v. 25.04.1998 (GV NW S. 265/SGV NW 2251), art. II, § 15.
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the federal government will continue to be limited to regulation of
the physical means of transmission while the Länder are permitted
to make decisions regarding Internet content is a primary issue addressed in this article. Traditionally, German media law manifests a
strong desire to protect pluralism and prevent the domination of
the media by any one political or commercial interest. At the same
time, broadcasting is free of censorship, but subject to limitation by
other general laws, including constitutional protections laid down
in the Basic Law, provisions in the Criminal Code, and youth protection laws. Some of the tensions between state and federal regulatory authority, the reach of the freedom of speech, and youth
protection issues are discussed in the following cases.
D. Recent Cases on the Road to Büssow’s Blocking-Order
Article 1 of Germany’s Basic Law proclaims: “Human dignity
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority.”77 Article 2 of the Basic Law covers personal freedoms, stating that “[e]very person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
law.”78 Article 3 covers equality before the law, declaring that “[n]o
person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage,
race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political
opinions. No person shall be disfavored because of disability.”79
Notwithstanding some apparently conflicting constitutional
protections, Germany has taken a strong stance against racism and
xenophobia, as reflected in the Basic Law and the German Criminal Code. For example, certain political parties, such as the Nazi
party (NSDAP), are illegal in Germany, as is the display of Nazi paraphernalia and propaganda.80 As the following case illustrates, Basic Rights under the Basic Law are not always absolute.
77. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1(1).
78. Id. art. 2(1).
79. Id. art. 3(3).
80. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 21(2) (“Parties that . . . seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional.”). The political party Sozialistische Reichspartei
upheld the Führerprinzip, an anti-democratic organizational structure, and the party’s
close relationship to the former NSDAP disregarded fundamental human rights, espe-
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Auschwitzlüge (“Auschwitz Lie”) held that a statement denying
the Holocaust was not protected speech under Article 5 of the Basic
Law.81 According to the Constitutional Court, the fundamental
right protected under Article 5 of the Basic Law is freedom of opinion.82 However, freedom of opinion is not unconditionally guaranteed. General laws may restrict the right to freedom as well as other
Basic Rights, such as personal honor.83 In interpreting a statute
limiting the freedom of opinion, the court must balance the value
of freedom of opinion along with the legal interest which the statute restricting the basic right serves.84
Assertions of fact are, strictly speaking, not statements of opinion.85 The protection of assertions of fact ends at the point where
they cease to contribute anything to the formation of opinion that
is presupposed under constitutional law.86 Incorrect information is
not an interest worthy of protection under Article 5.87 An assertion
of fact known or proved to be untrue is not covered by the protection of freedom of opinion.88 The court concluded that a statement asserting there was no persecution of the Jewish persons in
the Third Reich is an assertion of fact, which has been proven untrue by countless eyewitness reports, documents, criminal trial verdicts, and the findings of history.89 Accordingly, assertion of such
cially the dignity of man, the right to the free development of personality, and the
principle of equality before the law. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952) (F.R.G.); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] v. 15.05.1871 (RGB1. S. 127), amended by v. 22.08.2002
(BGB1. 1, 3390) §§ 86, 86(a) (making illegal the dissemination of propaganda and use
of symbols of unconstitutional organizations).
81. Auschwitzlüge, BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994).
82. Id. at B(II)(1).
83. Id. at B(II)(1)(c).
84. Id. See also Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (1958) (F.R.G.).
85. See Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198, 208.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Grundgesetz [GG] art. II(2)(b); compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (observing that some classes of speech “are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.”); but see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) (“[B]y characterizing fighting words as a form of ‘debate’, the majority
legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion.”).
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content does not enjoy the protection of freedom of opinion.90 Although the Auschwitz Lie case does not specifically address Internet
content, it is useful to illustrate the German attitude towards rightextremist ideology and propaganda.
The introduction of the Internet in Germany resulted in several judicial attempts to control illegal Internet content. In CompuServe, the local court in Munich (Amtsgericht München) held that
the managing director of CompuServe Germany, Felix Somm, was
personally liable under criminal law91 for child pornography located on a news server of CompuServe USA and accessible in Germany.92 The Local Court based its decision on the grounds that
CompuServe Germany was granting access to child pornography via
its parent affiliate in the U.S. when CompuServe USA had failed to
block access to the child pornography despite having knowledge of
the content and the technological means to block access to it.93 Felix Somm was sentenced to two years probation for the dissemination of pornography.94 The Munich Court of Appeals (Landgericht
München) reversed the decision in 1999.95 Some of the reasons
given for the reversal include the fact that CompuServe Germany
was completely subordinate to CompuServe USA and therefore had
no control over the web site, and that the mere knowledge of the
existence of the web site was not sufficient to constitute willful conduct. In addition, CompuServe Germany could not be considered
a “guarantor” of the unlawful content merely by granting access to
such content.96
90. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (concluding, after employing a balancing test,
that if statements of opinion containing assertions of fact are proved to be untrue, then
the freedom of opinion takes second place to the protection of personality); but see
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] BVerfGE 90, 1 1994) (F.R.G.) (holding that statements about guilt and responsibility for historical events pose a question of complex judgments which can not be reduced to an assertion of facts, while the denial of the event itself will generally have the
character of an assertion of facts).
91. §§ 184 Nr.3 StGB, § 14Nr. 1 StGB, § 25 Nr.2 StGB.
92. Entscheidungen des Amtsgericht München in Strafsachen [Munich Local
Court] Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (1995) [hereinafter CompuServe I].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Entscheidungen des Landgericht München I in Strafsachen [Munich State
Court I], 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95 (1999) [hereinafter CompuServe II].
96. Id.
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The CompuServe Court never approached the issue of legislative
competence between the Bund and Länder; it simply qualified CompuServe Germany as an ISP under section 3(1) of the Federal TeleServices Law, or Teledienstegesetz (TDG).97 The Court could have arguably applied the State Treaty on Media Services because Internet
newsgroups qualify as Media Services, not Tele-Services.98 The
CompuServe court never discussed the applicability of the MDStV,
a question which would become a centerpiece of the dispute over
Büssow’s Blocking-Order.
In December 2000, the German Federal High Court
(Bundesgerichtshof)99 upheld the conviction100 of an Australian
citizen, Dr. Fredrick Toben, for denial of the Holocaust, a criminal
offense under German law,101 even though the incriminating documents were located and disseminated from an Internet server located in Australia.102 Toben, a director and founder of the
Adelaide Institute, published a series of circulars and articles on the
Institute’s web site promoting revisionist theories of the Holocaust,
including a claim that “the original count of 4 million dead from
Auschwitz . . . can be lowered to 800,000 at the highest. This alone
is already good news, because it means that approximately 3.2 million people did not die in Auschwitz — a reason to celebrate.”103
In an open letter sent to a judge and the Berlin newspaper
Sleipnir,104 Toben proclaimed: “I visited Auschwitz in 1997, and I
have come to the conclusion based on my own investigation that
97. Id.
98. Lothar Determann, The New German Internet Law, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
LAW REV. 113 (1998).
99. [BGHSt] [Supreme Court], 1 StR 184/00 (2000).
100. Entscheidungen des Landgericht Mannheim, 5 Große Strafkammer [Mannheim State Court, 5 Chamber] 5 KLs 503 Js 9551/99 (1999).
101. § 130 Nr. 3 StGB (containing the “Auschwitzlüge” provision which makes it a
crime for anyone to publicly, or in a collection, condone, lie about, or play down past
deeds of the Nazis in a way that will disturb the public peace by promoting hatred
against a particular part of the population or damaging the human dignity). See also
Auschwitzlüge, BVerfGE 90, 241-55 (1994).
102. BGHSt 1, 184; see also Jones v. Toben [2002] FCA 1150 (Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry).
103. BGHSt 1, 184 at Internet Example II.1. The article was posted between April
1997 and March 1999. But see Toben, [2002] FCA 1150 at 18, 19 (indicating article was
posted in March 1996 and crediting Jean Claude Pressac with the statistics).
104. Sleipnir, Journal of History, Culture, Politics is considered a right-extremist newspaper and is currently being prosecuted in Germany. Sleipnir can be accessed at http:/
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during the war years the camp never had gas chambers in operation.”105 Finally, Toben posted a paper claiming that “looking back
on five years of work, we can firmly conclude: the Germans have
never exterminated European Jews in lethal gas chambers in KL
Auschwitz or other locations. Therefore, all Germans and people
with German heritage can live without a guilt complex being forced
upon them — a way of thinking that has maliciously enslaved them
for a half century.”106
The court’s ruling was based on the grounds that the relevant
text could be read and further disseminated in Germany and was
thus capable of disturbing public order.107 The Federal High Court
expressly pointed out that the ruling was limited to the criminal
liability of the author himself and should not be applied to ISPs.108
Both CompuServe and Toben demonstrate the willingness of German courts to apply German law to illegal content on Internet servers located outside German borders but accessible within Germany.
While the CompuServe I decision was eventually reversed,109 and the
Toben case ruling was limited to the criminal liability of the author,110 there have been no German cases to date successfully holding ISPs liable for the dissemination of unlawful hate-speech.
However, in neighboring France, an attempt was made to hold
the U.S.-based Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo!”) liable for allowing access to
Nazi and extremist propaganda and paraphernalia via its auction
site based in the United States. The French case against Yahoo!, as
detailed in the following paragraphs, has been cited by the Düssel/www.sleipnir.netfirms.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). Netfirms, which hosts Sleipnir,
is located in Toronto, Canada.
105. BGHSt 1,184 (Internet Example II.2, article posted in August 1998).
106. Id. (Internet Example II.3 Posted December 1999-January 2000).
107. Id. Compare Toben, [2002] FCA 1150 at 18 (concluding that “the act of placing
text and graphics on a web site which is not password protected is an act of publication,
or perhaps more accurately an act which causes repeated publications . . . .”); see also
Court of Cassation, Section V: Penal, Judgment No. 47141 (2000) (Italy) (holding
there are no national boundaries for libel on the Internet).
108. Id. See also “Verbreitung der Auschwitzlüge im Internet” [Spreading the Auschwitz Lie in the Internet], at http://www.eee.medien-recht.com/luege.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); “BGH: Volksverhetzung im Internet strafbar” [BGH: Incitement of
the People in the Internet punishable], at http://www.publex.de/cgi-bin/recht.cgi/Aktuell/news00121200.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
109. CompuServe II, 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95.
110. Id.
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dorf District Government as a reason for forcing ISPs in Germany
to block access to web sites featuring prohibited content. The Yahoo! case demonstrated, in the eyes of the district government, that
enforcement of a German court decision against an American ISP
would ultimately prove futile.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitism (“LICRA”) and
L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (“UESF”) filed a civil complaint
against Yahoo! in the Tribunal de grande Instance de Paris for violation of Section R645-1 of the French Criminal Code which prohibits the exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts for sale.111 The
complaint stemmed from Yahoo!’s auction site which allows anyone
in the world to post an item for sale and solicit bids from any Internet user around the world.112 Yahoo!, however, does not actively
regulate the content of each posting; therefore, some individuals
have posted highly offensive material on the auction site. Yahoo! is
incorporated in the state of Delaware, and operates regional web
sites, including Yahoo! France.113
The French court found that a large number of Nazi and Third
Reich related objects were being offered for sale on the Yahoo! auction site.114 Because any French citizen was able to access those
materials on Yahoo.com directly or via a link on Yahoo.fr, the
111. Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter
LICRA I] rev’d 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter LICRA II]. LICRA II reversed
the district court’s decision due to a lack of in personam jurisdiction over LICRA and
UEJF. The court of appeals held “[j]urisdiction may be obtained, and the First Amendment claim heard, once LICRA and UEJF ask a U.S. district court to enforce the French
judgment.” While this decision raises a host of interesting issues of personal jurisdiction, it does not substantively alter the district court’s analysis of Yahoo!’s First Amendment claim relevant to this article. See Sakura Mizuno, When Free Speech and the Internet
Collide: Yahoo!-Nazi-Paraphernalia Case, 10 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 56 (2001); see also
Benoı̂t Frydman and Isabelle Rorive, Fighting Nazi and Anti-semitic Material on the Internet:
The Yahoo! Case and its Global Implications, Keynote Address at the Cardozo School of Law
during the Conference: “Hate and Terrorist Speech on the Internet: The Global Implications of the Yahoo! Ruling in France” (Feb. 11, 2002), at http://www.pcmlp.socleg.
ox.ac.uk/YahooConference (last visited Sept. 17, 2002). But see “French Court Rules in
Favor of Yahoo in Internet Free Speech Case,” Center for Democracy & Technology, at
http://www.cdt.org/jurisdiction (Feb. 11, 2003) (holding that Yahoo! never tried to
“justify war crimes [or] crimes against humanity.” Please note that the Paris court dismissed criminal charges against Yahoo! and former CEO Tim Koogle).
112. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
113. Id. See http://www.yahoo.fr (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
114. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
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French Court concluded that Yahoo was in violation of Section
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code.115 The French Court ordered
Yahoo! to:
(1) eliminate French citizens’ access to any material on
the Yahoo.com auction site that offers for sale any Nazi
objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags; (2) eliminate
French citizens’ access to web pages on Yahoo.com displaying text, extracts, or quotations from Mein Kampf and
Protocol of the Elders of Zion; (3) post a warning to French
citizens on Yahoo.fr that any search through Yahoo.com
may lead to sites containing prohibited by Section R645-1
of the French Criminal Code, and that such viewing of
the prohibited material may result in legal action against
the Internet user; (4) remove all browser directories accessible in the French Republic index headings entitled
“negationists” and from all hypertext links the equation of
“negationists” under the heading “Holocaust.”116

The order also subjected Yahoo! to a fine of 100,000 Euros for each
day it failed to comply with the order.117
Yahoo! appealed to the French court to reconsider the terms
of the order, claiming that it could comply with the warning requirement on Yahoo.fr, but that the requirements regarding Yahoo.com were technologically impossible.118 The French court
solicited an expert opinion and subsequently reaffirmed its order.119 Yahoo! complied with the warning and changed its auction
guidelines, but as of October 24, 2001, Nazi memorabilia could still
be found for sale on the Yahoo! auction site.120
Yahoo! predictably appealed the French decision in the United
States, claiming that it lacked the technology to block French citizens from accessing the Yahoo! auction site or from accessing other
Nazi-based content of web sites on Yahoo.com121 Yahoo! claimed
that such a ban on content would “infringe impermissibly upon its
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1184-85.
Id. 1185.
Id.
Id.
LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 n.3-4.
Id. at 1185-86.
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rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”122 As a result, Yahoo! filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that the French court’s orders are neither cognizable nor
enforceable under U.S. law.123
The issue considered by the U.S. court was whether it was “consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States for another nation to regulate speech by a U.S. resident within the United
States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet
users in that nation.”124 The court stated that it “must and will”
decide the case in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and laws,
and recognized that in so doing it “adopts certain value judgments
embedded in those enactments, including the fundamental judgment expressed in the First Amendment that it is preferable to permit the non-violent expression of offensive viewpoints rather than
to impose viewpoint-based governmental regulation upon
speech.”125 The court further noted that both “the government
and people of France have made a different judgment based on
their own experience” and that the court did not intend to disrespect French judgment or experience.126
The U.S. court concluded the French order violated the First
Amendment. “The French order prohibits the sale or display of
items based on their association with a particular political organization and bans the display of web pages based on the author’s viewpoint regarding the Holocaust and anti-Semitism.”127 “A United
States court could constitutionally not make such an order.”128
“The First Amendment does not permit the government to engage
in viewpoint-based regulation of speech absent a compelling governmental interest, such as averting a clear and present danger of
imminent violence.”129 In addition, the French order was “far too
general and imprecise to survive the strict scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.”130 Phrases such as “all necessary measures” and
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
Id. at 1189 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
Id. at 1189.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
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“render impossible” instructed Yahoo! to undertake efforts that
would impermissibly “chill” or “censor protected speech.”131
The court then considered whether it could enforce the
French order without violating the First Amendment.132 No legal
judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of sovereignty from which its authority is derived.133 The extent to which
the United States or any state honors the judicial decrees of a foreign state is a matter of choice governed by the “comity of nations.”134 Comity “is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other.”135
U.S. courts will generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees
unless enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to U.S. interests.136 “The Court noted that the Internet allows one to speak in
more than one place at the same time.” France has the sovereign
right to regulate permissible speech within France, but a French
order that violates the protections of the First Amendment by “chilling” protected speech that simultaneously occurs within U.S. borders may not be enforced by a U.S. court.137 The Court concluded:
Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of
such standards to speech originating within the United
States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the
Court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.138

As the aforementioned case demonstrates, federal court precedent has now been established that would, in effect, allow a U.S.
based ISP or content provider to escape the enforcement of an or131. Id.
132. Id. at 1190.
133. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (2004).
134. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see also Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d
805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing how judgments of foreign courts are not automatically entitled to recognition or enforcement in American courts); Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986); Laker Airways Ltd v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
135. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164.
136. Sompertex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971); see also Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164, 193; Ackerman, 788 F.2d at 841.
137. LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
138. Id. at 1193.
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der given by a foreign court so long as the content at issue is protected under the First Amendment. The message of the case,
Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA was not lost on Jürgen Büssow.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND JÜRGEN BÜSSOW’S CRUSADE
AGAINST AMERICAN EXTREMISTS
It is often the case that what is illegal offline is also illegal online. This is particularly true regarding child pornography in the
U.S. and in Europe. Europe and the United States, however, diverge sharply on the question of whether racist and xenophobic
speech should be legal to publish or distribute via the Internet.
There is a fundamental and inescapable difference between the legal treatment afforded racist and xenophobic speech under the
American First Amendment and U.N., E.U., and German law.
Racist and xenophobic content online fall within the sphere of
Internet content regulation in Europe.139 One of the principal
challenges facing Internet content regulation is the “fundamental
clash” between the United States and Europe.140 The First Amendment of the American Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”141 The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that racist
and xenophobic propaganda are protected under the First Amendment as constitutionally protected forms of controversial political
speech.142 Generally speaking, governmental authorities are prohibited from imposing liability on ISPs for racist and xenophobic
content, either on the Internet or via traditional media.143
139. Isabelle Rorive, Strategies to Tackle Racism and Xenophobia on the Internet- Where
are We in Europe?, 7 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 8 (2002); see also Gianluca Esposito, Racist
and Xenophobic Content on the Internet- Problems and Solutions, 7 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y
9 (2002).
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
142. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) (“The history of the law of free
expression is one of vindication in cases involving speech that many citizens may find
shabby, offensive, or even ugly.”).
143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (2004) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Congress created “a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-
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Attitudes towards racist and xenophobic speech outside the
United States are far less tolerant. On a supra-national level, the
United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”144 The U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) provides that
signatory states “shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination . . . .”145 In addition, the 2001
U.N. Conference against racism in Durban, South Africa made
clear that Internet content should not be excluded from regulation.146 The United States, however, is not bound to follow the
U.N. provisions.147
Consistent with U.N. legislation, Europe has also enacted law
proscribing racist and xenophobic speech. According to Article 10
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 148 and the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, the right to free speech does not extend to speech that
party user of the service”). See also, Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993);
Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116 (1975).
144. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 20-22
145. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Jan. 4, 1969 art. 4(a). Germany signed the ICERD in 1969).
146. Rorive, supra note 139, at 5.
147. When the United States signed ICERD on September 28, 1966, it noted that
“nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or
other action” by the U.S. that is “incompatible” with the U.S. Constitution. When the
United States ratified ICERD on October 21, 1994, the Senate states: “The Constitution
and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of
speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United States does not accept any
obligation under this Convention, in particular under articles 4 and 7, to restrict those
rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that
they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” United Nations
Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United States of America declaration
(Feb. 5, 2002) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2_asp.htm.
148. United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United
States of America Declaration (Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/treaty2_asp.htm. The freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10
“carries with it duties and responsibilities, [which] may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . for the prevention of disorder or crime, for protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others . . . .” art. 10(2).
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threatens, denies or leads to the destruction of human dignity and
human integrity.149 Further, Article 17 of the Convention states
that none of its provisions grant the right to engage in any activity
that aims at destroying rights and freedoms of others.150
Germany also has strong national laws that vigorously protect
fundamental human rights and dignity, and proscribe actions and
information advocating forms of racism and xenophobia.151 CompuServe and Toben demonstrate the willingness of German courts to
protect German citizens from illegal Internet content.152 However,
in both instances, the ISP itself, the conduit through which the prohibited content was accessed, was specifically held not liable.153
Given that many, if not most authors of illegal web content are
unidentifiable or unreachable, there has been increasing pressure
to either enlist the voluntary support of ISPs in restricting access to
illegal web sites, or force the ISPs to filter and block access to illegal
content.154 As the Council of Europe considers a proposal outlawing the publishing of hate-speech on the Internet,155 Düsseldorf
149. Rorive, supra note 139, at 2.
150. United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations and Reservations, United
States of America Declaration (Feb. 5, 2002) at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/treaty2_asp.htm. See also, Rorive, supra note 139, at 2.
151. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1(1) § 130, available at http://www.dejure.org/
gesetze/StGB/130.html (translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited Nov.
3, 2003).
152. See CompuServe I, Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95.
153. See CompuServe II, 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95.
154. See Benoı̂t Frydman and Isabelle Rorive, Racism, Xenophobia and Incitement Online: European Law and Policy, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Oxford
University-Wolfson College, at http://www.selfregulation.info/iapcoda/rxio-background-02093.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
155. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the
Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems, Strasbourg, Jan. 28, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 189, at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). Article 3
of the Additional Protocol would require each Party to “adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law,
when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: distributing,
or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the public through a
computer system.” Paragraph 23 of the Explanatory Report attached to the Additional
Proposal says, “‘Distribution’ refers to the active dissemination of racist and xenophobic material . . . to others, while ‘making available’ refers to the placing on line of racist
and xenophobic material for the use of others. This term also intends to cover the creation or
compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate access to such material.” Id. at Explanatory Report, Nov. 7, 2002, ¶28, at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Trea-
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District Government President Jürgen Büssow has taken aggressive
steps to force ISPs operating in Nordrhein-Westfalen to block access to U.S.-based racist web sites.156 Büssow’s Sperrungsverfügung,
or “Blocking-Order,” of February 8, 2002, specifically ordered ISPs
based in Nordrhein-Westfalen to immediately block all access to the
right-extremist Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck web sites157 The Blocking-Order finds legal footing in the Mediendienste-Staatsvertag
(State Treaty on Media Services), a body of German state law that
was drafted, in part, as a reaction to the CompuServe cases and a
recognition of the need for laws applicable to new media.158
Should the First Amendment be the default standard for legally protected speech on the Internet? Jürgen Büssow has answered that question with his Blocking-Order. Will other German
Länder follow his lead? Will other E.U. Members? First, the legality
of the Blocking-Order must be analyzed under existing German
statutory and case law within the broader context of German media
law precedent. If Büssow’s Blocking-Order survives judicial scrutiny, it is important to consider the impact it will have on ISPs
worldwide, and perhaps more importantly, whether the United
States can afford to remain an island of protection for racists and
xenophobes.
ties/Html/189.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) (emphasis added). It should also be
noted that under Paragraph 45 of the Explanatory Report, which comments on Article
7 of the proposal (Aiding and abetting), an ISP “that does not have criminal intent
cannot incur liability under this section.” Further, Article 7 imposes no duty on an ISP
to actively monitor content in order to avoid criminal liability. See also Proposal for a
Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia, Commission of
the European Communities, 2001/0270(CNS), at http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/
en/com/pdf/2001/com2001_0664en01.pdf (Nov. 11, 2001).
156. Sperrungsverfügung [Blocking-Order], Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf [District
Government Düsseldorf], AZ 21.50.30 [hereinafter Sperrungsverfügung], available at
http://www.nps-brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/aufgaben/Abteilung_2/
Dezernat_21/Medienmissbrauch/Rechtsextremismus_im_Internet_Die_Sperr7072.
php (Feb. 6, 2002). See also Press Release, Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf erlässt BlockingOrderen wegen rechtsextremischer Angebot im Internet, Pressemitteilung available at
http://www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/index.php (Feb. 8, 2002).
157. Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 1.
158. Andreus Neumann, Das neue Multimediarecht- Einleitung zu IuKDG und
MDStV, Oct. 31, 2002, available at http://www.mathematik.uni-marburg.de/~cyberlaw/
texte/multimediarecht.html (translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited
Nov. 3, 2003).
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Regulatory Competence of the Bund and Länder: German
Statutory Law Applicable to the Internet

Germany is wrestling with the difficult problem of how to regulate the Internet. Currently, there are twenty statutory codes governing online services in Germany.159 Fortunately, nearly the same
rules apply throughout Germany because the individual Länder
codes resemble federal law.160 As the Television and Broadcasting
cases illustrate, content regulation in mass media has been subject
to a fundamental separation of power between the sixteen German
Länder and the Federal Bund.161
The split in regulatory competence between the Länder and
the Bund manifested itself in 1996 as the Länder began an initiative
to draft a “State Treaty on Media Services” and the Bund drafted a
proposal for the “Information and Communications Services Law”
(IuKDG).162 Almost immediately, the Bund and Länder began to
argue about the limits of their respective legislative authority.163 A
series of controversial discussions between the Bund and Länder occurred concerning the limits of state and federal authority to regulate online services.164 On the basis of a Compromise-paper passed in
June, 1996, the Länder claimed for themselves the regulatory authority for Media Services.165 The Bund, on the other hand, would
regulate online services that supplemented or replaced existing
telecommunications services, known collectively as Tele-Services.166
The final versions of the MDStV167 and the IuKDG came into force
159. See Determann, supra note 98, at 129.
160. Id.
161. See First Television, BVerfGE 12, 205 at D(II).
162. Neumann, supra note 158, at 1.
163. Id. at 2. See also George M. Bröhl, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für neue Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste, CR, 73-74 (1997).
164. Thomas Hoeren, Grundzüge des Internetrechts 95 (Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001).
165. Id.
166. Determann, supra note 98, at 137.
167. Staatsvertrag über Mediendienste [State Treaty on Media Services] [MDStV],
v. 20.05.1997 (NWGVB1 S. 134, BerlGVB1. 1997) amended by v. 20.12.2001 (GVB1. Berlin 2002, S. 162), available at http://www.mdstv.de (translated through http://www.
google.com) (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). All sixteen Bundesländer signed the MDStV
between January 20 and February 12, 1997. It should be noted here that a revised
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between January and June 1997.168 An analysis of Büssow’s Blocking-Order must begin with a comparative examination of the relevant statutory provisions of the MDStV and the IuKDG.
The federal IuKDG incorporates two new statutes specifically
dealing with Tele-Services.169 First, there is a specific code on TeleServices, the Teledienstegesetz (TDG), and a code applying to data
protection in connection with Tele-Services, the Teledienstedatenschutzgesetz (TDDSG). The TDG is the IuKDG code most relevant
to an analysis of the Blocking-Order. The IuKDG also amends
some existing federal statutes, including the German penal code
(StGB),170 the Youth Protection Media Law (GjS),171 and the intellectual property code (UrhG).172 The StGB and UrhG are currently applicable to all online services, including those defined as
either Tele-Services or Media Services.173 However, most provisions
in the GjS apply only to Tele-Services.174
The MDStV was uniformly enacted by all sixteen German
Länder as state code governing Media Services. The MDStV contains provisions on the same topics covered under federal law, inversion of the MDStV went into effect on July 1, 2002. Differences in the section numbers between MDStV 1997 and MDStV 2002 will be noted parenthetically when
relevant.
168. Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen für Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste (Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz) [Statute on
the General Conditions of Information and Communications Services] [IuKDG] v.
22.07.1997 (BT-Drs. 13/7934), available at http://www.netlaw.de/gesetze.iukdg.htm
(translated through http://www.google.com) (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (passed by the
German Bundestag on June 13, 1997).
169. See IuKDG, 22.07.1997.
170. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] v. 15.5.1871 (RGB1. S. 127), amended by v. 22.08.2002
(BGB1. I, 3390).
171. Gesetz über die Verbreitung jugendgefährdender Schriften und Medien [Law
Against the Distribution of Materials Endangering Minors] [GjS], v. 29.04.1961,
(amended 22.07.1997).
172. Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtgesetz)
[Intellectual Property Code] [UrhG], v. 09.09.1965 (BGB1. I S, 1273), amended by v.
01.09.2000 (BGB1. I S. 1374).
173. Determann, supra note 98, at 129.
174. Id. The GjS content-based speech restrictions have only been extended to
Tele-Services. GjS § 7(a) requires a Youth Protection Officer to be appointed for all
ISPs, including providers of Media Services. This extension was criticized by the
Bundesrat. See Bundestagsdrucksache [Federal Parliament Document] [BT-Drs], 13/
7285, 52; see also BT-Drs 13/7385, 70.
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cluding ISP liability, data protection, and protection against violent
and pornographic content.175
Both the IuKDG and the MDStV apply simultaneously in each
of the sixteen Länder.176 The applicability of the IuKDG or the
MDStV to a particular online service depends on whether the service is qualified as a “Tele-Service”177 or as a “Media Service.”178
The distinction between the definitions of Tele-Services and Media
Services is difficult because the technology covered by the IuKDG
and the MDStV is already similar.179 The spectre of technological
convergence adds to the difficulty in distinguishing new media
technology from the more traditional forms of media.180
In addition to problems arising from technological similarities,
the legal definitions of Tele-Services and Media Services are extremely vague.181 To further complicate matters, the examples outlined by the legislatures in the TDG and MDStV fail to clarify these
definitions and actually overlap.182
Tele-Services are defined as “all electronic information and
communication services which are designed for the individual use
of combinable data such as characters, images or sounds and are
based on transmission by means of telecommunication (Tele-Services).”183 The legislative history of the TDG suggests that it was
175. Determann, supra note 98, at 131.
176. Id. at 137. See also Grundgesetz [GG] art. 74 I(11) (assigning the legislative
power to regulate commerce to the federal Bund without limitation to interstate or
foreign commerce).
177. See Gesetz über die Nutzung von Telediensten (Teledienstegesetz) [Act on the
Utilization of Tele-Services] [TDG], v. 22.07.1997 (BGB1. I S. 1870), amended by v.
27.06.2000 (BGB1. I S. 897), § 2. (The Tele-Services Act was enacted as Art. 1 of the
Information and Communication Services Act [IuKDG], v. 22.07.1997 (BT-Drs. 13/
7934).
178. See § 2 MDStV (1997, 2002).
179. Determann, supra note 98, at 137.
180. See generally Rundfunkstaatsvertrag [Interstate Broadcasting Agreement]
[RStV] v. 31.08.1991 (Berl1. 1991 S. 309), amended by v. 6. July/7. Aug. 2000 (BerlGVB1.
2000 S. 447), § 2(1).
181. Determann, supra note 98, at 138. Definitions are found in sections 2 of the
IuKDG and MDStV, respectively.
182. Id. at 138-39. The definitions are contained in § 2(1) TDG and § 2(1) MDStV
(1997, 2002). The examples can be found in § 2(2) TDG and § 2(2) MDStV (1997,
2002). See also von Heyl, supra note 49, at 1; Rosenkranz, supra note 17, at 3.
183. § 2(1) TDG (“Die nachfolgenden Vorschriften gelten für alle elektronischen
Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste, die für eine individuelle Nutzung von
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intended to cover primarily commercial services offering individual
communications and services based on individual requests, rather
than services disseminated to the public like broadcasting or cable
television.184
However, non-commercial services can also qualify as Tele-Services.185 Under § 2(2) TDG, examples of Tele Services include in
particular: (1) services offered in the field of individual communication (e.g., tele-banking, data exchange); (2) services offered for
information or communication unless the emphasis is on editorial
arrangement to form public opinion (data services providing e.g.
traffic, weather, environmental and stock exchange data, the dissemination of information on goods and services); (3) services providing access to the Internet or other networks; (4) services offering
access to telegames; and (5) goods and services offered and listed in
electronically accessible data bases with interactive access and the
possibility for direct order.186 Notes accompanying the government
draft of TDG § 2 provide additional examples of Tele-Services, including: discussion forums, tele-commuting, tele-medicine, telelearning, home pages, search engines, mail-order businesses, broker services, and consulting services.187
Media Services are defined as the offering and use of information and communications services by the public, in text, sound or
image, transmitted via electromagnetic waves.188 The phrase “transmitted via electromagnetic waves” immediately suggests traditional
broadcasting technology inconsistent with the digital world of the
Internet. Indeed, the State Broadcasting Treaty (RStV) defines
broadcasting as the provision and transmission for the general public of presentations of all kinds of speech, sound and picture, using
kombinierbaren Daten wie Zeichen, Bilder oder Töne bestimmt sind und denen eine
Übermittlung mittels Telekommunikation zugrunde liegt (Teledienste).”).
184. Determann, supra note 98, at 139; compare § 2(2)(4) MDStV (1997, 2002)
(“On-demand Services”).
185. § 2(3) TDG.
186. § 2(2) TDG (emphasis added).
187. Determann, supra note 98, at 139. See also BT-Drs 13/7385, 18-19.
188. § 2(1) MDStV (1997, 2002) (“Dieser Staatsvertrag gilt für das Angebot und die
Nutzung von an die Allgemeinheit gerichteten Informations- und Kommunikationsdiensten (Mediendienste) in Text, Ton oder Bild, die unter Benutzung elektromagnetischeer Schwingungen ohne Verbindungsleitung oder längs oder mitttels
eines Leiters verbreitet werden.”).
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electromagnetic waves without junction lines or by means of a conductor.189 However, this apparent conflict is undone in the exclusion provisions of both the MDStV and the RStV. The MDStV
specifically provides that the regulations of the RStV remain unaffected.190 The RStV also provides that it does not apply to Media
Services as defined in § 2 of the MDStV.191
Having somewhat awkwardly extricated itself from the world of
traditional broadcasting, the MDStV proceeds to provide examples
of Media Services. In particular, the MDStV applies to the following: (1) distribution services in the form of direct offers to the public for the sale of goods or furnishing of services, including real
property, rights and duties, for consideration (Tele-shopping); (2)
distribution services, to which results of data inquiry are distributed
in text or image with or without a carrier tone; (3) distribution services in the form of television text, radio text and similar text services; and (4) on demand services, where performance is conveyed
for use on request from electronic storage in text, sound or image,
with the exception of such services where individual performance
or the pure conveyance of data is predominant, except
telegames.192
The baseline provisions of the TDG and MDStV make clear
that similar technology is contemplated in both codes. The question, for the purposes of this article, is which code applies to ISPs.
Section 2(2)(3)TDG specifically says that the Tele- Services are “services providing access to the Internet or other networks.” It sounds
very much like the TDG should prevail. However, the devil is often
in the exceptions to the rule. Section 2(4)(3) TDG specifically excludes “content provided by distribution and on-demand services if
the emphasis is an editorial arrangement to form public opinion
pursuant to § 2 of the Interstate Agreement on Media Services (Media Services Treaty) . . . .” Further, the TDG also excludes telecom189. § 2(1) RStV (“Rundfunk is für die Allgemeinheit bestimmte Veranstaltung
und Verbreitung von Darbietungen aller Art in Wort, in Ton und in Bild unter
Benutzung elektromagnetischer Schwingungen ohne Verbindungsleitung oder längs
oder mittels eines Leiters.”).
190. § 2(1) MDStV (1997, 2002).
191. § 2(1) RStV.
192. § 2(2) MDStV (1997, 2002). Please note that “individual performance” is the
author’s translation, and can be understood as the one-on-one exchange of goods and
payments.
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munications services and the commercial provision of
telecommunications services, as well as traditional broadcasting.193
Therefore, if ISPs provide either distribution services or on-demand
services, they fall under the regulatory umbrella of the MDStV, and
thus are subject to regulation through Jürgen Büssow’s BlockingOrder.
Recalling the distinction in German media law between the authority of the Bund to regulate means (e.g., frequency allocation)
and the authority of the Länder to regulate content, it is not surprising there is a similar tension concerning Internet regulation. Prior
German case law indicates longstanding support for this separation
of power, and to allow Internet content regulation to fall under the
purview of a federal statute would clearly be contradictory to traditional legal thinking. The debate surrounding the applicability of
the IuKDG or the MDStV has been hotly contested in Germany.
B. An Overview of Büssow’s Blocking-Order
The storm clouds began to gather in Nordrhein-Westfalen
months before the Düsseldorf District Government issued its initial
order to ISPs to block extremist web pages.194 Jürgen Büssow indicated early on that he believed the district government could regulate the access to extremist web sites under the MDStV.195 In
October 2001, Büssow invited local ISPs via a written invitation to a
hearing where the legal basis for blocking extremist web sites under
the MDStV would be clarified.196
193. § 2(4)(1)-(2) TDG. The TDG excludes “Telecommunications” as defined
under § 3 of the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) and broadcasting under §2 of the
Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RStV).
194. See Strafen für Provider für rechtsextreme Internetseiten, 26.08.2000, at http:/
/www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jk-26.08.00-005/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2003); OnlineAnbieter sollen Nazi-Sites sperren, 28.05.2001, at http://www.heise.de/newsticker/
data/em-28.05.01-000/ (last visited Nov. 3 2003).
195. Id. Büssow indicates that should ISPs continue to offer extremist web sites,
they could face fines up to 500,000 DM under the MDStV.
196. See Anhörung- Aufsicht nach dem Mediendienste-Staatsvertrag (MDStV), AZ
21.50.20, Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf, 04.10.2001. The Anhörung issued by the District
Government Düsseldorf can be understood as a draft proposal for the later BlockingOrder. The provisions are largely identical, with the notable exception that http://
www.rotten.com was not listed as one of the prohibited web sites in the Blocking-Order.
Another site originally listed in the Anhörung was http://www.front14.org, which was
defunct by the time the Blocking-Order was issued). See also Nordrhein-westfälische
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Büssow released the Blocking-Order in February 2002.197 The
Blocking-Order begins with a recital of legal authority granted
under the MDStV giving the district government oversight of ISPs
and Internet content. The Blocking-Order states that ISPs fall
within the definition of “Provider” under § 3(1) MDStV.198
As such, the district government has the authority under the
MDStV to regulate ISPs and the content accessible via their networks.199 In particular, § 18(1) MDStV grants the district government the power of oversight for youth protection purposes
pursuant to § 8 MDStV.200
Under MDStV § 18, the Blocking-Order ordered ISPs to block
access to Stormfront and Nazi-Lauck.201 Stormfront is an American
service provider which exclusively hosts right-extremist Internet
sites, for the most part in English. Stormfront offers several services
for a fee, such as server space, data transfer and email addresses
with individual domain names.202 Stormfront clearly expresses its
right-extremist point of view, declaring “White Pride World Wide,”
and offers a German language section featuring an article advocating censorship-free “Free Zones.”203 The Stormfront homepage
provides access to various services, links, a “Kids Page,” and a
“Women’s Page,” all of which promote racist ideology.204 The
Provider sollen Nazi-Web sites ausfiltern, 08.10.2001 http://www.heise.de/newsticker/
data/hod-08.10.01-001 (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
197. Press Release, Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf erlässt Sperrungsverfügungen
wegen rechtsextremischer Angebote im Internet, 42/2002 (Feb. 8, 2002), at http://
www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/index.php.
198. Sperrungsverfügung, AZ 21.50.30, 06.02.2002, at 1. “‘Provider’ means natural
or legal persons or associations of persons who make available either their own or thirdparty media services or who provide access to the use of media services.” MDStV § 3(1)
(1997). Please note that the definition of “provider” in § 3(1) TDG is identical to
MDStV except that the word “Tele-Services” is substituted for “Media Services.”
199. Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 1.
200. Id. See § 7 MDStV (1997) (Content, Duty of care to a child, Opinion Poll); see
also § 8 MDStV (1997) (Prohibited Media Services, Youth Protection); see also §9
MDStV (1997) (Advertising, Sponsoring); see also §§ 11, 12, 13, 22(1) MDStV (2002).
201. § 22 MDStV (2002).
202. See White Nationalist Community, at http://www.stormfront.org (last visited
Sept. 15, 2004).
203. Id. See also Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 1. Please note that a “Free
Zones” article found on the Stormfront site features the phrase “wir bestrafen
Abweichler und Feinde” [“we punish deviants and enemies”]. The same phrase was
selected to appear in the Blocking-Order.
204. http://www.stormfront.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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Blocking-Order concludes that the site, on the whole, is aimed at
building and influencing public opinion.205 The determination
that a site contains editorial content intended to influence public
opinion has a direct bearing on whether the site can be regulated
under the MDStV or under the TDG. Further, the many available
links constitute the informational equivalent of a “Lazy Susan” for
the German right-extremist scene.206
According to the Blocking-Order, Stormfront is prohibited
under § 8(1) MDStV, because it violates the regulations in the German penal code.207 The elements of Volksverhetzung, or Incitement
of the People, are fulfilled by promoting hatred against Jews and
foreigners.208 Stormfront also violates the penal code for using and
distributing symbols and propaganda material for unconstitutional
organizations, namely Nazi swastikas and symbols.209 Stormfront
also violates § 8(1)(2) by glorifying war, and § 8(1)(3)MDStV by endangering children.210
The Blocking-Order concludes that Stormfront promotes national socialist ideology with the goal of establishing national socialist rule. National socialist ideology stands in conflict with the moral
ideals of German social and legal order, and therefore is considered a great moral danger to children and youth.211
For similar reasons, the Lauck site is also prohibited under the
MDStV and the penal code. The Lauck site features national socialist propaganda material, including a free download of Hitler’s Mein
Kampf, as well as national socialist songs, symbols, mobile phone
ring tones, articles, flyers for download and printing, and replicas
of Zyklon B gas canisters featuring the “KZ Auschwitz” logo.212
The Lauck site violates the penal code for incitement of the
people through the open approval of the annihilation of the Jews
205. Id.
206. Id. (the word used in the Blocking-Order is “Verteilerdrehscheibe”).
207. § 12 (1) MDStV (2002).
208. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 2. See also § 130 StGB, supra note
101.
209. See § 86 StGB (use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations).
210. See http://www.stormfront.org. (last visited Sept. 15, 2004); see also §§ 12(1)(3) MDStV (2002).
211. Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 1.
212. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com. (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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under the Third Reich.213 The use of Nazi symbols and distribution
of propaganda materials violates § 86 StGB. The Lauck site glorifies war via the free distribution of Mein Kampf, certain music files,
and Music-CDs.214 As with Stormfront, the Lauck site is deemed to
promote national socialist ideology with the goal of establishing national socialist rule. Because national socialist ideology promoting
the “Führer Principle” (Führerprinzip) conflicts with the moral ideals
of German social and legal order, it is deemed to be a great moral
danger to children and youth.215
According to § 5 of the MDStV, ISPs are answerable under law
for their own content (Content-Provider), and for foreign content
(Service Provider), only when the ISP has knowledge of the content
and it is possible to prevent access to the foreign content.216 If an
ISP acts merely as an Access Provider, providing Internet service
without knowledge of content, it is not responsible for foreign
content.217
It would seem that if an ISP is merely providing access to foreign content, it can escape legal liability.218 According to the interpretation under § 18(3) MDStV, this is not so.219 If it is proven that
content cannot be blocked under § 18 as a Content Provider or as a
Service Provider, a mere Access Provider can still be held accountable for blocking content and treated as a Service Provider if it attains knowledge of content consistent with the
Telecommunications Secrecy provision of the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG).220 Thus, if a mere Access Provider gains knowledge
213. See http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com. Please note that the mere approval
of Nazi atrocities against the Jews is a prima facia violation of § 130 StGB.
214. Id. See § 8 MDStV (1997) (MP3 music files for download include the Horst
Wessel Lied). See § 12 MDStV (2002).
215. http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com; see § 6, § 23 BVerfGE (1952).
216. See §§ 6, 9 MDStV (2002).
217. http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2004); see § 5
MDStV (1997) (providing definitions of Content, Service, and Access Provider); see § 7
MDStV (2002).
218. See CompuServe I, Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95; see also CompuServe II, 20 Ns
465 Js 173158/95.
219. § 22(3) MDStV (2002).
220. See Id.; see also Telekommunikationsgesetz [Telecommunications Law] [TKG]
25.07.1996 (BGB1. I S. 1120), amended by v. 31.01.2001 (BGB1. I S. 170), § 85 (Telecommunications Secrecy); see also Press Release, Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf nicht “die
Wacht am Rhein” im Internet- Düsseldorfer Regierungspräsident weist taz-Bericht
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of illegal content through any means, even knowledge attained
through the operation of the network, it can be forced to block
access to the illegal content under the MDStV.221
The Blocking-Order asserts that a direct request for assistance
from the American Service Providers would not be feasible.222 Yahoo! v. LICRA indicates that European laws and judicial decisions
may not be upheld in the United States.223 As a result, German
ISPs cannot shift blame to the American content and service providers in an attempt to avoid liability under German law.
The MDStV makes clear that ISPs are only responsible for
blocking prohibited content if it is technologically possible and reasonable to do so.224 According to the Blocking-Order, it is both
technically possible and reasonable to block access to the prohibited web sites. For § 5 of the MDStV to apply, there must be reasonable technological means available to block access to the prohibited
content.225 Perhaps drawing from the conclusions of the French
court in Yahoo! v. LICRA,226 the district government lists a number
of technological means that may be employed to effectively block
access to Stormfront and the Lauck site.227 The ISPs may exclude
the domain from the Domain-Server (DNS), use Proxy-Servers, or
exclude the prohibited site through a router.228 ISPs are also rezurück, 70/2002 (Feb. 26, 2001), at http://www.brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/
index.php. The duty of Access Providers to block prohibited content under § 18(3)
MDStV (§ 22(3) MDStV 2002) is not unclear or uncharted legal territory. See also § 22
MDStV (2002). Compare TDG § 5(4), infra note 242, 255.
221. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 6. The District Government Düsseldorf points out that the ISPs were notified of the illegal sites in the Anhörungsschreiben in October 2001. This would presumably make it difficult, if not impossible, for
the targeted ISPs to claim lack of knowledge of the prohibited sites.
222. Id. In fact, the District Government Düsseldorf did request that Stormfront
and Lauck block access to the prohibited content. Not surprisingly, there was no reaction from either site.
223. See LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.
224. See § 5 MDStV (1997); see also § 7 MDStV (2002).
225. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 6. See also § 5(1)(2) MDStV
(1997). The standard is whether it is “technologically possible and reasonable” to block
access or use of the prohibited content. See §§ 6,9 MDStV (2002).
226. See LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
227. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 6.
228. Id. at 6, 7. The Sperrungsverfügung does not detail the technical aspects of
blocking access to the web sites. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to recognize that the filtering occurs after the user sends the request for the web page and
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quired to block access to the sites via “mirror sites” and search engines.229 Not surprisingly, and perhaps with good reason, ISPs in
Nordrhein-Westfalen have hotly disputed the technological effectiveness of the proposed methods.230
According to the Blocking-Order, it is quite reasonable for ISPs
to implement the necessary filtering technology because, in a balancing test between the burden to ISPs and the potential danger to
society, the concerns of society and the protection of legally protected rights of persons are paramount.231 The Blocking-Order lists
in detail right-extremist related crime statistics to highlight the current and future danger posed by right-extremist propaganda and
organizations.232 Therefore, the concrete danger to society posed
by right-extremists outweighs any burden imposed on the ISPs to
filter the prohibited sites.
The Blocking-Order acknowledges that the technical measures
employed by ISPs will largely affect the average Internet user, and
only a technologically savvy minority will be able to circumvent the
blockade.233 According to the Blocking-Order, it is not necessary
either prevents the request from reaching the desired server or prevents the content
from being transmitted to the user.
229. Id. at 10. See also Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, Localized Google
Search Result Exclusions, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, at http://
www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google (last visited April 3, 2003). French and
German Google search engines appear to filter search results for sites with content that
may be sensitive or illegal.
230. See Stefan Krempl, Netsperre für Fritschen Doof, 22.11.2001, at http://www.
heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/11175/1.html (last visited Oct 24, 2002); Provider
halten Sperrung von Websites für unwirksam und unzumutbar, 13.11.2001, at http://
www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/22653 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
231. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 8 (“Da insofern der Rechtsextremismus auch eine konkretisierte Gefährdung für die o.g. Rechtsgüter aber auch für
Leben und Gesundheit vieler Einzelner darstellt, wirkt die Belastung der Anbieter
durch eine Sperrung nicht so schwer, wie der Schutz der bedrohten Rechtsgüter”). See
also, Stamm, supra note 20, at 25. The freedom of speech per Article 5 is subject to the
Doppelbegründung doctrine, which calls for a balancing of the right to opinion against
other basic rights, such as the right to personality. See also Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198-230
(1958).
232. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 7, 8. In 2000, 15,951 criminal acts
were committed which had proven or suspected right-extremist origins, while in 1999,
10,037 criminal acts were committed. Most of the cases (6,823) were propaganda offenses. Further statistics include: 579 violent offenses, 508 attacks against persons, 385
people injured by right-extremists, and seven attempted murders.
233. Id. at 9.
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that access to the sites be completely blocked in order to justify the
implementation and execution of the law, only that progress is
made toward the ultimate goal of blocking illegal content.234
Therefore, it is enough that the average user will be prevented from
accessing the illegal content.
The Blocking-Order finally concludes that the freedom of access to information under Article 5(2) of the Basic Law is not violated.235 Internet users have no constitutional claim to access
prohibited information, because the information itself is already illegal under the German penal code.236 However, in order to comply with Article 5(3) of the Basic Law, the Blocking-Order exempts
schools and universities from the order, so long as the sites are accessed for art and scholarship, research or educational purposes.237
C. Objections and Answers: Büssow holds his ground
1. Applicability of the MDStV
One of the first objections to Büssow’s Blocking-Order concerned the applicability of the MDStV to all ISPs.238 To qualify as a
Provider under § 3(1) of the MDStV, the web sites must necessarily
qualify as Media Services.239 However, it is not clear that access to
all web sites can qualify as a Media Service, because not all sites
necessarily contain edited content.240 According to Jugendschutz.net, a youth protection watch-dog organization, some youth
protection organizations founded in other Länder have qualified
home pages as “Individual communications,” whereby they qualify
234. Id. at 8-9. See generally HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (5th ed., 2000).
235. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 10. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(2)
(“These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for
the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.” The criminal
code falls within “provisions of general laws.”).
236. See Sperrungsverfügung, supra note 156, at 10. See, e.g., §§ 84, 85, 86, 130, 185,
189 StGB; see generally GjS.
237. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5(3) (“Art and scholarship, research, and teaching
shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to
the constitution.”).
238. Thomas Hoeren, Stellungnahme zur geplanten Sperrungsverfügung der Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf (Hearing Nov. 13, 2001).
239. § 3(1) MDStV (1997, 2002), supra note 198.
240. Hoeren, supra note 238, at 2 (comparing web sites that have edited content
and sites which merely present a series of photos).

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR104.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 39

BATTLE AGAINST HATE-SPEECH ON THE INTERNET

15-DEC-04

8:40

391

as Tele-Services.241 If web sites qualify as Tele-Services, not Media
Services, the Blocking-Order cannot find a legal basis in the
MDStV. Instead, it may be possible to regulate ISPs as providers of
Tele-Services under § 5(4) of the TDG, which provides similar provisions as MDStV § 18(3) used in the Blocking-Order.242
The district government maintains that it can regulate all ISPs
under the MDStV.243 According to the district government’s Widerspruchsbescheid,244 a “reply to the appeal” of the ISPs, the ISPs do not
fall under the jurisdiction of the TDG or TKG245 as either TeleService Providers or Network Providers. Access Providers provide
protocol functions such as IP-Addresses, Name-Service, and Routing, and cannot be considered to be Network Providers who do not
provide these additional protocols for users.246 Further, Tele-Service Providers offer services limited to the field of individual communications, whereas Access Providers offer services which can be
accessed by multiple users simultaneously.247 Finally, both the TDG
and TKG contain provisions that seemingly exclude Access
Providers.248
241. Id. See § 2(2)(1) TDG; see also http://www.jugendschutz.net/teledienst.net
(last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
242. § 5(4) TDG (“The obligations in accordance with general laws to block the
use of illegal content shall remain unaffected if the provider obtains knowledge of such
content while complying with telecommunications secrecy under § 85 of the Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) and if blocking is technically feasible
and can reasonably be expected.”). See § 22(3) MDStv 2002; see also Hoeren, supra note
238, at 4.
243. Widerspruchsbescheid zur Sperrverfügung, Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf,
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.nps-brd.nrw.de/BezRegDdorf/hierarchie/aufgaben/Abteilung_2/Dezernat_21/Medienmissbrauch/Widerspruchsbescheid_zur_
Sperrverfuegun8229.php (last visited April 14, 2003).
244. See MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, § 7.05
(2002). The ISPs initiated a protest procedure against the district government’s Blocking-Order by filing a complaint, or Widerspruch. The Widerspruchsbescheid is the district
government’s reply to the ISPs appeal. The Widerspruchsbescheid is the final administrative procedure before resorting to the courts.
245. Telekommunikationsgesetz [Telecommunications Law] [TKG] v. 25.07.1996
(BGB1. I S. 1120), amended by v. 31.01.2001 (BGB1. I S. 170).
246. Id. at 1.
247. Id. See § 2(1) TDG (“Teleservices within the meaning of § 2 (1) shall include
in particular . . . services offered in the field of individual communication.”).
248. § 2(4)(1) TDG (“This Act shall not apply to . . . telecommunications services
and the commercial provision of telecommunications services under § 3 TKG”). See
§ 3(18) TKG (“‘telecommunications services’ [shall mean] the profit-oriented offer of
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In addition, the Widerspruchsbescheid points out that web sites
are not Individual Communications, because unlike letters or telephone conversations, they are accessible to everyone.249 In this
sense, Access Providers do not violate Telecommunications Secrecy
if they block access to illegal web sites.250
Instead, web sites, according to Büssow, in particular Stormfront and Lauck, are Media Services in that they are organized and
contain editorial content similar to a magazine.251 When combined
with right-extremist symbols and images, it becomes clear that the
sites intend to influence public opinion and are therefore mass
communications, not individual communications.252
Further, the regulation of Access Providers is consistent with
the intent and purpose of the MDStV. Because it is not possible to
regulate content originating outside Germany, the MDStV contemplates the authority to require German ISPs to block foreign content that is illegal according to German law.253
2. Available Technology and Reasonableness?
German ISPs seized immediately upon the technological burdens associated with blocking access to the Stormfront and Lauck
sites. In particular, ISPs claimed that any measures taken would be
largely ineffective due to ever-changing IP-addresses, proxy servers
and mirror sites.254 Further, a 2000 decision by the Munich Regional Appellate Court (OLG München) declared that it is not necessary for an ISP to consider every potential access alternative when
telecommunications, including transmission line offers to third parties); § 3(5) TKG
(“‘commercial provision of telecommunications services’ [shall mean] telecommunications offered on a sustained basis, including transmission line offers to third parties,
with or without the intention to realise profits”).
249. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 10 (1) (“The privacy of correspondence, posts and
telecommunications shall be inviolable.”); § 85 TKG, supra, note 220.
250. § 85 TKG, supra note 220.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Widerspruchsbescheid, supra note 243, at 3 (justifying the applicability of
§ 18(3) MDStV (1997) currently § 22(3) MDStV (2002)). Id. at 4-5 (documenting unsuccessful attempts to require the U.S. Providers and the F.C.C. to block the illegal
content. Also a repetition of the unwillingness of the U.S. to enforce the French judgment in LICRA I, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
254. Hoeren, supra note 238, at 3.
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blocking illegal content.255 The Widerspruchsbescheid reiterated that
the technological means to block access to the site exist and are
reasonable to apply.256
3. Constitutionality
The Widerspruchsbescheid answers a number of constitutional objections raised by ISPs. Access Providers claimed they were being
treated differently than Network Providers, and therefore the
Blocking-Order violated Article 3(1) of the Basic Law.257 The
MDStV contemplates three levels of responsibility for Content, Service, and Access Providers, respectively. Access Providers are not
singled out for sole responsibility under the MDStV and are thus
not the subject of unfair discrimination.
ISPs may not rely on the Article 5 exception for art and scholarship, research, and teaching. This exception does not apply to
private entities that are not solely concerned with education or
research.258
The constitutional right to occupational freedom is also not
violated by the Blocking-Order. Article 12 of the Basic Law is subject to the limitations of other laws, such as the MDStV.259 Because
the limitations imposed by the Blocking-Order are relatively unburdensome compared to the rights of youth protection, human
dignity, and public security, there is no constitutional claim under
Article 12.260
4. European Law
The Blocking-Order comports with European legal and political principles.261 The E-Commerce Directive allows member states
to enact measures to combat hatred based on race, gender, relig255. Entscheidungen des Oberlandesgericht München [OLG München], Multimedia und Recht [MMR], 10 (2000), 617 (CD-Bench case). The decision was based on
TDG § 5(4) and is of questionable applicability).
256. Widerspruchsbescheid, supra note 243, at 5-7. The same reasons given in the
Blocking-Order are repeated almost verbatim.
257. Id. at 7. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 3(1) [All persons shall be equal before the
law].
258. Widerspruchbescheid, supra note 243, at 5-7. See Grundgesetz [GG] art 5(3).
259. Id. at 8. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12, 12(1).
260. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12, 12(1).
261. Id.
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ion, or nationality.262 Article 12 of the Directive contemplates legal
action against Access Providers.263
D. The Administrative Courts: First Round Decisions
After exhausting all available administrative procedures with
the district government264 the ISPs filed suit in six administrative
courts (Verwaltungsgerichte) in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Administrative
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and typically entertain disputes between private parties and administrative agencies.265 Administrative courts may decide constitutional questions so long as
both parties are not constitutional organs, such as the federal and
Länder governments.266 The primary focus of the administrative
court is to address whether a specific administrative agency decision
is “well-founded and supported by the applicable statute, regulation
and general principal of public law.”267
Many of the following cases make broad statements concerning
the legality of the Blocking-Order. The standard of review applied
to administrative decisions is whether the agency has exceeded the
statutory limits of its discretion, or if the agency has abused its
power in contradiction to statutory intent.268 An ill-advised exercise
262. The Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive), 2000/31/EC,
art. 3(4)a)(i) (Original Journal L 178 9 2000) (“Member States may take measures to
derogate from paragraph 2 in respect of a given information society service if . . . necessary for one of the following reasons: public policy, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses, including the protection of
minors and the fight against incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or
nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons.”).
263. Id. art. 12(3) Directive 2000/31/EC at (l 178) 9 (“This Article shall not affect
the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member
States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or to prevent an
infringement.”).
264. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, § 7.05
(2002). Before a claim may be made in an Administrative Court, the plaintiff must
exhaust all administrative procedures. This was accomplished when the ISPs issued an
appeal (Widerspruch) to the district government, and the district government in turn
delivered its “reply to the appeal” (Widerspruchbescheid) refusing to amend the BlockingOrder.
265. Id. at 2. See generally VwGO, v. 21,01.1960 (BGB1 I S. 17), amended by VwGO v.
13.06.1980 (BSB1 I S. 677).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id. at 4.
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of discretion is not necessarily illegal, and courts may not review the
expediency of discretionary administrative decisions.269 If the administrative decision is within the legal scope of discretion and is
based on proper consideration of fact and law, the court may not
“second guess” the agency.270 The net effect is that administrative
courts review administrative decisions with great deference.
To date, thirty-six out of seventy-six Access Providers in
Nordrhein-Westfalen have opposed the Blocking-Order, and ten
lawsuits have been filed.271 Since October 2002, there have been
seven court decisions regarding the Blocking-Order. All but one,
Minden, have supported Jürgen Büssow’s Blocking-Order.
1. VG Minden
The 11th Chamber of the Minden Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Minden) handed down the first decision
regarding the Blocking-Order on October 31, 2002.272 However,
the Minden court did not do much more than recognize that legal
issues exist. The court did not make a decision as to the legality of
the Blocking-Order, saying that the order was “neither blatantly legal [n]or blatantly illegal,” and did not approach the issue of
whether the MDStV or IuKDG was the correct statutory basis for the
Blocking-Order.273 Instead the court decided in favor of the ISPs,
stating that the interests of the ISPs outweighed public interests.274
The ISPs were not required to block the web sites pending further
judicial review. The District Government of Düsseldorf immediately appealed the decision to the High Administrative Court in
Münster.275
269. Id. at 5.
270. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 7.05
(2002) at 1.
271. Sperrung der Internet-Angebote http://www.stormfront.org und www.nazilauck-nsdapao.com, AZ 21.50.30-22/01 (Sept. 6, 2002). The Sperrung ordered that all
internet providers in Nordrhein-Westfalen comply immediately with the Blocking-Order of February 6, 2002, and the Widerspruchsbescheid of July 29, 2002.
272. Verwaltungsgericht Minden [Administrative Court Minden] [VG Minden], 11
L 1110/02 (October 31, 2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/vgminden_20021031.html (last visited Jan. 30 2003).
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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2. VG Arnsberg
On December 6, 2002, the Administrative Court in Arnsberg
released the first decision in favor of the Blocking-Order.276 The
Arnsberg court held that the District Government had the proper
authority and interest sufficient to support issuing the Blocking-Order.277 Further, the Arnsberg court found the interests of the ISPs
inferior to the public interest behind the immediate order to block
the extremist web sites.278 The court found that it was in the public
interest to be spared from Volksverhetzung (Incitement of the People) on the Internet, and that this interest could be served by blocking access to the extremist web sites.279
In response to the claim that the Blocking-Order imposed too
great a burden on the ISPs, the Arnsberg court forcefully responded, “Our legal system . . . does not protect business interests,
even those indirectly affected, if they contravene the free democratic constitutional order by promoting — regardless of the origin
— Incitement of the People. Such Interests are never worthy of
protection.”280
3. VG Gelsenkirchen
Twelve days later, the ISPs received another blow from the Administrative Court in Gelsenkirchen.281 Consistent with Minden
and Arnsberg, the Gelsenkirchen court found that the BlockingOrder was not blatantly illegal. More importantly, the court found
that offering access to the web sites named in the Blocking-Order
constituted a Media Service within the meaning of the MDStV
276. Verwaltungsgericht Arnsberg [Administrative Court Arnsberg] [VG Arnsberg], 13 L 1848/02 (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/200300
10.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
277. Id. at ¶7. See also § 80 VwGO.
278. Id. at ¶10.
279. Id. at ¶11.
280. Id. at ¶13 (“Unsere Rechtsordnung schütz indessen keine wirtschaftlichen Interessen, die mittlebar betroffen sind, wenn durch Volksverhetzung gegen die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung- durch wen und von welchem Ort aus auch immer
verstoßen wird. Solche Interessem sind nicht schützenswert.”).
281. Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen [Administrative Court Gelsenkirchen] [VG
Gelsenkirchen] 1 L 2528/02 (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/vg-gelsenkirchen_20021218.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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§ 2(2).282 The Gelsenkirchen court concluded that offering access
to the banned Internet sites constituted a Distribution Service or an
On-Demand Service, and could thus be distinguished from TeleServices governed under the TDG.283 The MDStV concerns itself
with information and communications services offered to the general public, while the TDG contemplates information and communications services limited to individual use.284 The crucial
distinction in the mind of the court was that the content found on
the Stormfront and Lauck sites was clearly directed towards and accessible by the general public in contrast to a small user group or
individuals.
The Gelsenkirchen court held that both the Stormfront and
Lauck sites contained content prohibited under § 12 MDStV. As a
result, the Blocking-Order is supported under § 22 MDStV 2000.285
After examining the web sites, the court found numerous examples
of content which clearly violated the penal code and could endanger children.286 The court found that all of the prohibited content
was intended to influence public opinion and therefore fell within
the purview of the MDStV.
Finally, the Gelsenkirchen court held that public interest in
preventing Volksverhetzung outweighs any interests of the ISPs.287
The court emphasized the importance of § 130 StGB’s prohibition
of Volksverhetzung, noting that in light of Germany’s history, there is
special responsibility to protect the German population from direct
attacks on human dignity.288 The court acknowledged the danger
of “poisoning the political climate if national-socialist violence and
tyranny were found to be harmless.”289
282. Id. at 3. See § 2(2) MDStV (1997, 2002), supra note 186.
283. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 3.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 4. See § 12 MDStv (1997, 2002); see also § 8, 18 MDStV (1997).
286. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 4 (discussing examples including: the
use of swastikas, downloadable propaganda materials, a downloadable copy of Mein
Kampf, downloadable propaganda films such as The Wandering Jew. The court made a
detailed reference to Gary Lauck’s photo, which shows him wearing a Hitler-like haircut and mustache, and clothed in a khaki uniform shirt with a swastika armband).
287. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 6.
288. Id. See also BGH 1 StR 184/00 (Dec. 12, 2000).
289. VG Gelsenkirchen, supra note 281, at 6.
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4. VG Düsseldorf
On December 19, 2002 the Administrative Court in Düsseldorf
handed down a detailed decision regarding the legality of the
Blocking-Order.290 Although the effect of the decision is substantially the same as that of Arnsberg and Gelsenkirchen, the Düsseldorf court explored in greater detail the relationship between the
MDStV and the IuKDG, as well as some constitutional issues not
discussed in previous decisions. First, the Düsseldorf court took up
the issue of whether access to the prohibited web sites falls within
the scope of the MDStV or one of two federal statutory provisions,
namely the Telecommunications Law (TKG) and the IuKDG’s TeleServices Law (TDG).
The court determined that Access-Providers could either be
Media Services Providers under § 3(1) MDStV or Tele-Services
Providers under § 3(1) TDG, but could not be Telecommunications Service Providers under § 4 TKG.291 The court distinguished
Telecommunications Service as having a “technical-side,” such as
pure data transport, as opposed to “content offers,” either on an
individual or mass-communications basis.292 Because Internet Access-Providers are more concerned with offering content, the TKG
can not be applied to Internet access service.293
The court acknowledged that the challenged Blocking-Order
could find a legal basis in either the MDStV or in the TDG in combination with general legal rules.294 The court went on to note that
even if the ISPs were found to offer Tele-Services rather than Media
Services, the outcome would be substantially the same: The ISPs
could be forced to block access to the prohibited sites.295
The Düsseldorf court examined the applicable provisions of
the MDStV and concluded that there is a clear legal basis for supporting the Blocking-Order. The court concluded that “The Media
Services Treaty 2002 — and not the TDG 2001 — is applicable to
290. Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf [Administrative Court Düsseldorf] [VG Düsseldorf], 15 L 4148/02 (2002).
291. Id. at 13. See § 3(1) MDStV (1997, 2002).
292. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 13.
293. Id. at 14.
294. Id.
295. Id. See Hoeren, supra note 238.
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the appellant [ISPs].”296 The Düsseldorf court found that Media
Services include, in particular, on-demand services, and distinguished Tele-Services as applicable to individual communications
or pure data transfer.297 As such, Media Services apply primarily to
services for the general public, while services which are primarily
for individual communication fall within the scope of the TDG.298
The court gave examples of communications services which have a
more concrete individual nature, such as telebanking, or the exchange of X-ray pictures and medical data between a hospital and
family doctor.299
However, when the services in question have the primary purpose of providing access to sites that influence public opinion, then
the Media Services Treaty applies.300 Both the Stormfront and the
Lauck sites contain editorial content in combination with links to
additional sources and provide offers to purchase goods, and as
such, these sites cannot be considered to offer the “pure information” contemplated by services covered under the TDG.301
The Düsseldorf court entertained the appellants claim that
they should be considered providers of Tele-Services under the
TDG. The court concluded that even if this were the case, the district government would still have the duty and authority to order
the ISPs to block the sites in question.302 On the basis of the jurisdiction granted under Article III of the State Treaty amending the
Broadcasting State Treaty of December 12, 2000,303 the state legislature intended to give local authorities, such as the Düsseldorf District Government, the authority to regulate both Media Services
and Tele-Services.304 The Düsseldorf District Government is
charged with the general duty to protect the public, and given the
illegality and public danger posed by both the Stormfront and
Lauck sites, the district government would be obliged to order the
296. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 15.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 16.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 24.
303. Staatsvertrag zur Änderung rundfunkrechtlicher Staatsverträge, v. 12.12.2000
(GV NRW S. 706).
304. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 24.
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sites blocked under the authority of § 8(2) TDG in conjunction
with §§ 86, 130 StGB.305 The court noted that even if ISPs were
relieved of responsibility for the web site content under the TDG,
they would still be responsible to block access to the content under
the general laws, in particular the penal code.306 Thus, according
to the court, any exception for content liability under the TDG
would not, in the end, relieve the ISPs from liability under any
other statute prohibiting the web site content. As such, the ISPs
still have a duty to block access to the Stormfront and Lauck sites.
The Düsseldorf court concluded that the content of Stormfront and the Lauck site clearly violated § 12 MDStV and provisions
of the penal code.307 The district government had the authority to
order ISPs to block access to the sites under § 22 MDStV. Both sites
violated §§ 86, 130 StGB by glorifying the murder of Jews under the
Nazis, and by using prohibited symbols of National Socialism, such
as the swastika.308 Therefore, there was ample justification to order
access to the web sites blocked under the MDStV.
The Düsseldorf court also found that it was technically possible
for the ISPs to block access to the prohibited web sites.309 While
the court noted that the available filtering technology would not be
completely effective, it was “a step in the right direction” and sufficient to frustrate the average Internet user’s attempts to access the
prohibited sites.310 For this reason, the available technology is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 22 MDStV.
The Düsseldorf court addressed several constitutional defenses
raised by the ISPs. First, the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs claimed they
were not being treated equally under Article 3 of the Basic Law
because ISPs in the other Länder were not subjected to the Blocking-Order. The court held that Article 3 only applies to the actions
of a public authority within its jurisdiction.311 The fact that all ISPs
305. Id. at 25.
306. Id. See §§ 9-11 TDG (exceptions for ISP content liability).
307. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 17. See § 12 MDStV (1997, 2002).
308. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 17. See § 18 MDStV (1997).
309. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 20.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 21. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfG] Az. 2
BvR 1619, 1628, 1683 (2002); Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, BVerfGE
79, 127, 168 (1988).
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in Nordrhein-Westfalen were being treated equally is not disputed.
Therefore, an objection under Article 3 must fail.
The ISPs also raised defenses under Article 5 of the Basic Law,
including freedom of opinion, freedom of broadcasting, and the
prohibition against censorship.312 The Düsseldorf court held that
the provisions of Article 5 are subject to “general laws,” including
those for the protection of youth and those incorporated within 22
MDStV.313 The general laws provision is not intended to prohibit
opinions, but is instead intended to protect the continued existence of the state and its constitution against attacks, independent
of the concrete intent or effect of a statement of opinion.314 This is
particularly true when the opinions in question have been deemed
punishable under criminal law for endangering state and constitutional principles protecting democracy.315
The court described the censorship provision in Article 5 as a
“Limitation-limit,” and not an original basic right.316 While the
censorship provision is clearly designed to prevent so-called preventative-censorship, it does not preclude a public authority from
prohibiting a broadcast, or in this instance a Media or Tele-Service
from providing access to material deemed criminally injurious to
the principles of a free democratic constitutional order.317
The ISPs also raised objections under Articles 12 and 14 of the
Basic Law. Article 12, Occupational Freedom, guarantees the right
to freely choose an occupation or profession.318 The court found
that the Blocking-Order did not prohibit a choice of profession, but
rather regulated the practice of the ISPs’ occupation. There was no
violation of Article 12 because all ISPs in Nordrhein-Westfalen are
312. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21. See Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5. See § 18
MDStV (1997).
313. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 5.
314. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21; see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, BVerfGE 47, 198 (232) (1978).
315. VG Düsseldorf, 15 L 4148/02, 21.
316. Id. at 22.
317. Id.
318. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 12 (stating that all Germans shall have the right freely
to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a
law).
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equally regulated and because there is no prohibition against the
choice of profession.
The ISPs raised a similar objection under Article 14, which
guarantees property and the right of inheritance.319 The court
found that Article 14, much as Article 12, allows the content and
limits of property to be defined by other laws, and concluded that
such a defining law was § 22 MDStV.320
The Düsseldorf court’s decision supported the legality of the
Blocking-Order and answered a number of legal and constitutional
questions not addressed by previous decisions. However, even
though the Düsseldorf court clearly thought the ISPs were providing Media Services, by considering the possibility that the TDG
could potentially be applicable, it left the door open for future
courts to reconsider whether ISPs can, or should, be regulated
under the Tele-Services law.
5. VG Aachen
In the first decision of 2003, the Administrative Court in
Aachen dealt ISPs another blow in favor of Büssow’s Blocking-Order.321 The Aachen court found that the Blocking-Order was
neither obviously illegal nor obviously legal.322 In congruence with
prior decisions, the Aachen court recognized that some legal issues
beyond the scope of the district government’s authority to issue the
Blocking-Order might be appealed to a higher court for final
disposition.
The Aachen court found that the MDStV, not the TDG, was
the correct legal foundation for the Blocking-Order.323 The
Aachen court focused, as did prior courts, on the difference between offering information in editorial form for the purpose of influencing public opinion and contrasted it with offering
319. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 14 (stating that property and the right of inheritance
shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws).
320. VG Düsseldorf, supra note 290, at 23. See § 18 MDStV (1997).
321. Verwaltungsgericht Aachen [Administrative Court Aachen] [VG Aachen], 8 L
1284/02 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20030075.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003)
322. Id. at ¶4.
323. Id. at ¶7.
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information for individual use.324 When information is offered, either as a distribution or on-demand service, in a way that could influence general public opinion, the MDStV must apply. It is only
when the information is offered for individual use that the TDG
may apply.
The Aachen court found that the web sites targeted by the
Blocking-Order were intended, via their presentation and form, to
influence general public opinion and not for individual use.325
The court supported its finding by citing examples from the Lauck
site, such as a subtitle for an alleged interview with Osama bin
Laden, “Die for Israel? No, thanks!”326 The court further noted
that the sites contained links to purchase related material which
strengthened the conclusion that the purpose of the sites is to influence public opinion.327
The Aachen court further found, without much difficulty, that
the content of both sites violated § 12 MDStV via violations of the
penal code.328 The sites were found to have violated § 130 StGB,
Incitement of the People, by offering videos such as The Wandering
Jew and texts such as Mein Kampf. 329 The court also found that the
use of National Socialist symbols, such as swastikas and SS-runes,
violated § 86 StGB.330 The Aachen court further noted that even
discounting the aforementioned criminal violations, the sites would
still be prohibited under § 12 MDStV due to the danger posed to
children and youth, as well as injury caused to human dignity.331
Although the ISPs claimed that because the content originated
outside Germany it could not be held accountable under the penal
code, the court found that in the instant case, the prohibited con-

324. Id.
325. Id. at ¶8.
326. Id.
327. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶8.
328. Id. at ¶9. See § 12 MDStV (1997,2002).
329. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶9. The court singled out a tag-line from The
Wandering Jew: “Animal lovers all over the world sharply protest the comparison of
(four-legged) rats with their infinitely worse two-legged species.”
330. Id. (noting in particular the collection of National Socialist graphic available
on Stormfront).
331. Id. See § 12 MDStV (1997, 2002).
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tent has made a successful entry into Germany, and could be subjected to the provisions of the penal code.332
The Aachen court also rejected the ISPs claim that they could
not be held accountable for content originating in the U.S. because
they are mere Access Providers, and not Content or Service Providers under § 6 MDStV.333 The court concluded that Access Providers could still be regulated under § 7 MDStV because they
transmitted foreign content over a communications net, in this instance by providing access to the use of foreign information.334
The Aachen court concluded that an order to block access to
the Stormfront and Lauck sites was justifiable, even if the available
technology would only be effective against the average Internet
user. The district government has a duty to protect against general
threats and even against what may be perceived as a latent threat to
society.335 Therefore, it is sufficient to frustrate the average user’s
access, and it is not necessary to contemplate all possible ways the
prohibited sites might be accessed.336
Finally, the Aachen court forcefully addressed the ISPs’ complaints that immediate compliance with the Blocking-Order would
damage their business interests. The ISPs argued that, while the
matter was still being disputed in the courts, compliance with the
Blocking-Order be suspended because customers might switch to
other ISPs and because of the expenses related to blocking the prohibited sites.337 The court responded, saying that the interests of
the ISPs were subordinate to the interests of society.338 The primary objective of § 130 StGB is to protect the public peace, and
from a historical and contemporary perspective, there is an overriding goal to promote harmony between different groups of people
living in Germany.339 As such, this supports blocking Internet sites
which glorify right-extremist ideology — not only the ideology on
National Socialism — which primitively propagates a hatred of the
332. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶8. See BGH, 1 StR 184/00 (Dec. 12, 2000); see
also § 9(1) StGB.
333. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶10. See § 5 MDStV (1997).
334. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶10. See § 5 MDStV (1997).
335. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶15.
336. Id.
337. Id. at ¶16.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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Jews and also attacks the dignity of other societal groups living in
Germany.340 The distribution of materials such as the song “The
Zillertaler Türkenjäger” and stickers featuring swastikas and the
phrase “Foreigners Get Out” poison the social climate, in light of
this danger, the interests of the ISPs are clearly subordinate.341
6. VG Köln
On February 7, 2003, the Administrative Court in Köln released its decision regarding the Blocking-Order and sided again
with the district government.342 The Köln court held that the
Blocking-Order was not obviously illegal, and that it was more likely
a legal application of the MDStV.343 The Köln court followed the
analysis of the Düsseldorf court, and determined that an AccessProvider can be regulated under either the MDStV or the TDG, but
not the TKG.344 The Köln court distinguished the technical aspect
of a Telecommunications-Provider under the TKG from the more
content-oriented services provided by a Media Services or Tele-Services Provider. The court found that the form of the content on
the web page was germane to determining whether the Access Provider was providing a Media Service under the MDStV or a TeleService under the TDG.345 The court’s review of both prohibited
web sites revealed that “without a doubt, the editorial form [of the
sites] was primarily intended to influence public opinion.”346 As
such, the MDStV, which applies to mass-communications, not the
individual communications contemplated under the TDG, provides
a sound basis for the Blocking-Order. Like the Düsseldorf court,
the Köln court also noted that even if the TDG were applicable, the
Blocking-Order would still be supported.347
340. Id.
341. VG Aachen, supra note 321, at ¶16. (examples given by the court appear on
the Lauck site).
342. Verwaltungsgericht Köln [VG Köln] [Administrative Court Köln] 6 L 2495/02,
available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/vg-koeln_20030207.html (Feb. 7,
2003).
343. Id. at II(2)(a).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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The Köln court also found that it was technologically possible
and reasonable to block access to the prohibited sites.348 The court
noted that the district government had requested voluntary compliance without success. In addition, the court specifically mentioned
that the two largest ISPs in Germany, AOL and T-Online, had voluntarily blocked access to the sites despite being outside the jurisdiction of the Blocking-Order.349
The Köln court also found that the interests of the ISPs did not
outweigh public interest in blocking access to the sites.350 The
goals of public peace, youth protection, and the protection of individual rights such as human dignity, especially when viewed in light
of Germany’s history, took precedence over any interests the ISPs
may have.351
The Köln decision completed the first round of Administrative
Court decisions on the enforceability of Büssow’s Blocking-Order.
Only the Administrative Court in Minden offered any tentative support for the ISPs; the other courts, Arnsberg, Gelsenkirchen, Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Köln, albeit with some reservations, clearly
favored Büssow’s order. The ISPs filed appeals to the High Administrative Court in Münster, which handed down its first decision on
March 19, 2003.352
7. OVG Münster
The Münster court affirmed the decision of the Arnsberg court
in favor of the Düsseldorf District Government and ordered that
access to the prohibited web sites be immediately blocked.353 The
Münster court repeated that public interests outweigh any interests
of the ISPs and affirmed the legality of the Blocking-Order under
the MDStV.354 The court affirmed that the content of both web
sites violate the provisions of the MDStV and the StGB, citing exam348. VG Köln, supra note 342, at II(2)(a).
349. Id.
350. Id. at II(2)(b).
351. Id.
352. Oberverwaltungsgericht Münster [High Administrative Court Münster] [OVG
Münster], 8 B 2567/02 (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.artikel5.de/entscheidungen/ovg-muenster_20030319.html (Mar. 19, 2003).
353. Id. See VG Arnsberg, 13 L 1948/02.
354. OVG Münster, supra note 352.
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ples that satisfied the requirements for incitement of the people,
unconstitutional organizations, the glorification of war, and the endangerment of children and youth.355 The court further affirmed
that it was technologically possible and reasonable for the ISPs to
block access to the prohibited sites; it quoted the Arnsberg court
finding that even if not all users could be prevented from accessing
the sites, it was a “step in the right direction.”356 However, as a
small consolation to the ISPs, the Münster court left open for appeal the question of whether a mere Access Provider could be held
accountable for content originating outside Germany.357
For the time being, virtually all access to Stormfront and NaziLauck is blocked in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Jürgen Büssow’s Blocking-Order has survived the initial scrutiny of the Administrative
Courts and the High Administrative Court in Münster. However, it
must be remembered that these initial court decisions did nothing
more than decide that it was permissible to block access to the sites
under the MDStV.
Following the OVG Münster decision, the case will return to
the Administrative Court in Arnsberg to consider principle legal issues of the ISPs’ appeal to the Blocking-Order. The Arnsberg court
will examine the Blocking-Order in greater detail and consider the
applicability of the MDStV, the TDG, and constitutional objections
under Article 5 of the Basic Law.
Following a second decision from the Arnsberg court, the ISPs
may again appeal to the High Administrative Court in Münster.
From there, if the decision is again unfavorable, the ISPs may appeal to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht)
in Leipzig. Only after a decision by the Federal Administrative
Court may the ISPs appeal to the Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Karlsruhe.
The administrative court decisions to date have done little
more than affirm the authority of Jürgen Büssow and the Düsseldorf District Government to regulate ISPs under the State Treaty
on Media Services. However, this is not an insignificant finding, as
the courts have maintained continuity with the historical develop355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id. See VG Arnsberg, 13 L 1948/02.
OVG Münster, supra note 352.
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ment of German media law which allocates the authority to regulate media content with the State rather than the federal
government. It is likely that the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs will
continue to appeal the decisions of the administrative courts with
the hope that subsequent proceedings will focus more heavily on
the constitutional issues of free speech and freedom of the press.
However, as outlined in Part II of this article, the German courts
have not been receptive to including racist or extremist speech
within the sphere of speech protected under Article 5 of the Basic
Law. Further, it would be difficult to show that Stormfront and
Nazi-Lauck do not violate any provisions of the German penal code.
In these respects, the Nordrhein-Westfalen ISPs face an uphill
battle.
There are at least two arguments that favor the ISPs. First, the
ISPs may have a valid argument that the technological means required to block access to the web sites will either be ineffective or
will become so burdensome that few ISPs will be able to survive
financially. The Internet is a quicksilver environment where technology becomes obsolete in stunningly short periods of time. It is a
strong possibility that by the time the court proceedings are concluded, the filtering technology proposed in the Blocking-Order
will be obsolete. Should the ISPs be forced to continually develop
new filtering technology to keep pace with those who are determined to circumvent such technologies?
Second, the Blocking-Order only requires that access to two
web sites be blocked. The Stormfront and the Lauck sites are certainly powerful examples of hate-speech on the Internet, but they
are only representative of thousands of such web sites. An important question for the courts to address is how to differentiate between Stormfront, which is in clear violation of German law, and
those web sites which contain similar content in an entirely different context, such as sites containing historical documents or accounts of Nazi atrocities. While Büssow’s Blocking-Order may
appear sound in theory, the practical application of such an order
could yield over-broad results significantly reducing the positive social and/or democratic effects of the Internet.
It is also important to consider the effects of the Blocking-Order within Germany and on the world stage. If the Blocking-Order
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were ultimately upheld in the courts, it could conceivably be implemented in the other German States. The MDStV is a treaty between
the States, but the extent to which the other German states would
implement a MDStV-based Blocking-Order is unclear. One possible scenario is that the various German states enact Blocking-Orders of varying degrees or against different web sites. Some may
not issue a Blocking-Order at all. This possibility could create a
confusing regulatory regime within Germany and cause significant
difficulties for ISPs operating in several States.
Finally, from a global perspective, Büssow’s Blocking-Order appears to fit nicely with U.N. and E.U. law prohibiting racist and
xenophobic speech. If successful, Büssow’s Blocking-Order may be
copied in other countries in Europe and around the world. This
would result in a “Balkanization” of the Internet — different regulatory regimes would apply to different geographical parts of the
globe. The problem is, the Internet does not respect geographical
boundaries and does not exist in any one place. If such a splintered
regulatory system were to develop, ISPs could face multiple content
filtering requirements and varying levels of liability, both civil and
criminal, worldwide. Compliance with multiple regulatory regimes
would be a financial and technological nightmare for any ISP seeking to do business internationally.
V. CONCLUSION
Will the Internet remain a realm free from governmental interference? Will the Internet be “Balkanized” into national spheres of
influence where content is regulated according to national social,
moral, and legal standards? Will Germany, and potentially the European Union, take a stand against the First Amendment protection granted to hate-speech? These are some of the larger
questions that may be answered in Germany’s higher courts.
The separation of legislative competence between the Bund
and Länder, as formalized in the early broadcasting cases, will likely
be applied to Internet regulation. Legislative competence over media content will remain in the hands of the Länder, and Internet
content will be subject to regulation under the MDStV rather than
any federal law. To do otherwise would require a reinterpretation
of the Basic Law and overturning what has been a stable, successful
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model of media regulatory structure. Further, Germany would
have to reconsider its penal code and its attitudes towards National
Socialism and hate-speech. In light of the Auschwitz Lie case, and
German history, it is not likely that German courts will allow sites
like Stormfront or Nazi-Lauck any protection under Article 5. Further, European Union Directives lend support to Germany’s hard
line stance against hate-speech. Jürgen Büssow’s Sperrungsverfügung
will, more likely than not, survive judicial scrutiny.358

358. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, Don Black’s and Gerhard Lauck’s First Amendment
privileges have been revoked.

